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PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON DEMONSTRATIONS
Vince Blasi*
[W]isdom cries out in the streets, and no man regards it.
-William Shak.espeare1
I.

INTRODUCTION

s recently as seven years ago, the Supreme Court could characterize a mass demonstration of 187 blacks at a Southern state
capitol as "an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their
most pristine and classic form.'' 2 In retrospect, the choice of the
adjective "pristine" to describe the phenomenon of mass protest
seems to have been itself pristine, if not naive. The remark is instructive, however, in that it reveals how the current constitutional
doctrine governing mass demonstrations was formulated in a quite
different protest era, guided in large part by an almost idyllic
imagery: the polite, if persistent, Jehovah's Witness; the stoic, disciplined (and well-financed) Freedom Marchers; the unsophisticated, highly visible Southern police bully. With the spotlight
shifted to the Weathermen and the Hard-Hats, the Vietnam Moratorium and the Chicago Parks Department, it may be that the inherited constitutional doctrines are no longer adequate.
Some of those doctrines have to do with the special problem
of prior restraints-most significantly, permit requirements and
injunctions. Presently, these regulatory devices are subject to only
the most amorphous of constitutional controls. Although the Supreme Court has favored street protestors with volumes of rhetoric
and numerous after-the-fact legal victories, it has contributed virtually nothing in the way of concrete standards and procedures
that have any impact when constitutional protection is most needed
-before and during the demonstration. With regard to substantive
standards, the Court has failed to recognize some of the more
difficult issues, has written unintelligibly on others, and, in the one
important area where it has formulated doctrine carefully, has

A

• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Northwestern University; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago.-Ed.
I would like to express my appreciation for the special assistance given me in the
preparation of this article by four good friends: Professors Paul Brest and Richard
Markovits of Stanford Law School, Professor George Schatzki of The University of
Texas Law School, and Mr. Edward Mallett of the Texas Bar.
1. THE FIRST PART OF THE HISTORY OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH, act 1, sc. 2, ll.
73-74 (H. Richmond ed. 1967).
2. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
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selected a standard that gives local officials virtually unlimited
authority. 3 In the procedural realm, the Court has hinted in dictum that prior restraints on demonstrations will be measured against
the developing standards of "first amendment due process,"4 but
no significant breakthrough, much less a comprehensive approach,
has yet materialized.
The starting point for the analysis that follows is the belief
that new constitutional doctrine-both substantive and procedural
-is urgently needed. That conclusion rests on two critical assumptions-assumptions which may not be shared by others who read
history differently, 5 or who have had different personal experiences
regarding prior restraints on demonstrations, or who have different
behavioral impressions based on observation and conversation, or
best of all, who have quantitative data on the problem.
The first assumption is that the mass protest demonstration is,
and should be, a full-fledged member of the first amendment pantheon. It is true that the Court has classified mass demonstrations as
"speech plus," 6 but that categorization, if it has any utility at all,7
relates to the need for a different first amendment standard based
on the presence of unusually tangible and serious countervailing
regulatory interests which may not be adequately protected by a test
such as "clear and present danger"; "speech plus" does not suggest
that the speech component is any less important, or that the constitutional presence should be any less commanding.
There are many reasons why demonstrations should qualify for
unadulterated first amendment protection. One is the specific wording of the constitutional text: "the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
Another is the fact that political persuasion in the second half of the
twentieth century is closely related to media exposure; demonstrations, rightly or ·wrongly, attract the television cameras and result in
the airing of slogans-if not cogent critiques-that would not otherwise penetrate into the inner reaches of Middle America. It might
3. See text accompanying notes 17-33 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 200-06 infra.
5. See generally E. HoBSBAWM, PruMmVE REBELS (1965); G. RUDE, THE CROWD IN
HISTORY (1964); THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, A REPORT SUBMI'ITED TO THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (H. Graham 8: T.
Gurr ed. 1969). See also G. LEBON, THE CROWD (2d ed. 1968); N. SMELSER, THEORY OF
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR (1963).
6. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
7. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.

R.Ev. 1, 25.
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also be suggested that mass gatherings provide some index of the
breadth and depth of sentiment on a particular issue, information
that can be useful to the guardians of the old order as well as to
proponents of change. A freedom-of-association argument can be
fashioned, pointing to the role demonstrations play in helping the
disparate adherents to a cause meet each other, raise funds, and
sometimes discover an unexpected unity and momentum. To the
extent that the first amendment is concerned with self-actualization
-with free expression in a more psychological sense-the physical
"step fonvard" can be an important moment, as Billy Graham,
among others, can attest. It is no doubt true that mass demonstrations can be politically counter-productive, but that would seem to
be a determination best left to the protestors themselves.
The second important assumption is that political and social
pressures are especially intense during disputes over demonstrations
-so much so that every effort should be made to have the issues
decided according to previously established doctrines that are as
specific and conclusive as is feasible, and also by tribunals that are
as immune as possible from those pressures by virtue of tenure, geographic remoteness, or multimember constitution. Such virtues as
"detachment," "objectivity," and "neutrality" can never be achieved
in any absolute sense-and they can be pursued only at a sacrifice
of flexibility, intuitive judgment, and "realism." The trade-off will
not always be salutary, particularly in those problem areas, including
demonstration regulation, for which the fact situations are unusually
varied and the costs of unrealistic decisions unusually high. But that
determination should not be made in the abstract or in general; an
issue-by-issue analysis is required.

II.

THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDs-PossIBLE

REAsoNs

FOR

PROHIBITING DEMONSTRATIONS

It used to be that municipalities could prohibit demonstrations
on public property at whim; all that was necessary was an assertion
of the prerogatives traditionally associated with the private ownership of land. The doctrine had its genesis in a characteristic effort by
Justice Holmes, then on the Massachusetts supreme court, to solve a
difficult first amendment problem by simplistic resort to a commonlaw concept: "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in the house." 8 Forty-two years later,
8. Davis v. Massachusetts, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), afjd., 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
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Justice Roberts responded to Holmes in kind, finding his own simplistic succor in the common-law doctrines of adverse possession and
public trust: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."0 The Roberts approach has prevailed, so much so that the
Supreme Court recently held that even privately owned shopping
centers must show a good deal more than "naked title" in order to
prohibit protest activities.10
Beyond the rhetoric and the generalities and the superficial
private-law analogies which have dominated judicial discussion of
the problem of demonstrations on public land, there lie some extraordinarily difficult value conflicts-conflicts that the courts have barely
begun to face up to in any meaningful way. For purposes of analysis,
the issues may be defined in terms of the possible reasons a municipality may have for refusing to allow a proposed demonstration. At
least eight such reasons can be imagined: (1) competing public uses;
(2) the message of the demonstration; (3) the purpose of the demonstration; (4) the fear of a hostile audience; (5) the past conduct of the
applicants; (6) an immediate background of violence; (7) failure by
the demonstrators to make a timely application for a permit; and
(8) the applicants' refusal or inability to pay the costs associated with
the demonstration.

A. Competing Public Uses
A decision to grant a demonstration permit is a decision to
allocate to the applicants' use a number of limited public resources.
While the streets and parks may "belong to the people," as the slogan
has it, the people usually want to use those streets and parks for
purposes other than demonstrating-driving, parking, strolling,
shopping, playing, gossiping, relaxing, contemplating. The people,
moreover, generally prefer to deploy their policemen in crime-ridden
neighborhoods rather than on parade routes or at rally sites. The
individual and societal interest in expression, including mass demonstrative expression, and the danger of bias against unpopular elements of the community, make the problem of prior restraints on
demonstrations one of constitutional dimension; but that should not
obscure the fact that the problem is primarily a question of resource
allocation among competing, legitimate interests rather than a matter
9. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
IO. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 324 (1968).
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of irreducible, fundamental rights. Even absolutists must retreat in
the face of Harry Kalven's "unbeatable proposition that you cannot
have two parades on the same corner at the same time." 11
When one recognizes, as has the Supreme Court,12 that the proper
rubric is resource allocation, the constitutional issue turns out to be
one of specificity and proof: how must the competing public uses
be characterized and quantified before the courts will be satisfied that
the free speech interest has been given its due? Although the Court
has invalidated many permit systems dealing with handbills,13 solicitations,14 soundtrucks,15 and mass gatherings,16 virtually all of those
regulatory schemes failed utterly to articulate any standards for
ruling upon the permit applications. Only two Supreme Court decisions have dealt with demonstration permit systems that attempted
to establish issuance criteria in terms of competing public uses, and
in both cases the question was the validity of the permit scheme on
its face, and not the propriety of a specific injunction or permit
denial.
In Cox v. New Hampshire 11 the Supreme Court upheld a statute
which, as interpreted by the New Hampshire supreme court, required the issuance of a permit "if after a required investigation it
was found that the convenience of the public in the use of the
streets would not thereby be unduly disturbed, upon such conditions
or changes in time, 'place and manner as would avoid disturbance."18
The Court's holding has two important features. First, at least in
order to be held valid on its face, the scheme need require no finding
more specific or concrete than "undue" disturbance of public "convenience." Second, the city can insist on "conditions or changes" with
respect to time, place, and manner of the demonstration if such
changes would "avoid disturbance," presumably even if the time,
place, and manner preferred by the applicants would not create an
undue disturbance.
11. Kalven, supra note 7, at 25.
12. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. Town of Irvington,
308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
14. See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S.
418 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
15. See, e.g., Soia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
16. See, e.g., Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
17. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
18. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 146, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at 312 U.S. at 576,
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At issue in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham19 was the following standard: "The commission shall grant a written permit for such
parade, procession or other public demonstration, prescribing the
streets or other public ways which may be used therefor, unless in its
judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good
order, morals or convenience require that it be refused." 20 While
acknowledging the special regulatory problems presented by mass
gatherings, the Court nonetheless found the handbill cases21 controlling for the constitutional requirement of "narrow, objective, and
definite standards to guide the licensing authority," 22 and held that
the Birmingham ordinance did not measure up to that requirement:
"[E]ven when the use of its public streets and sidewalks is involved
.•. a municipality may not empower its licensing officials to roam
essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to speak,
assemble, picket or parade according to their own opinions regarding
the potential effect of the activity in question on the 'welfare,' 'decency,' or 'morals' of the community."23 Lest it be thought, however,
that lack of specificity was the defect, it should be noted that the
Court withheld condemnation of the other criteria in the Birmingham ordinance-"peace," "health," "good order," "convenience"and also that the opinion described the disapproved criteria as "entirely unrelated to legitimate municipal regulation of the public
streets and sidewalks."24 Another pregnant omission was the Court's
failure to say anything about the provision giving the licensing officials apparently plenary power to prescribe "the streets or other
public ways which may be used therefor."25
Probably the most significant part of the Shuttlesworth opinion,
however, is its dictum. The Alabama supreme court had attempted
to save the Birmingham ordinance by means of a "remarkable job of
plastic surgery,"26 incorporating word-for-word the standard approved in Cox v. New Hampshire-"the convenience of the public
in the use of the streets or sidewalks would not thereby be unduly
disturbed." 27 The Supreme Court refused to recognize this gloss of
19. ll94 U.S. 147 (1969).
20. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 1159 (1944), quoted at 394 U.S. at 149-50.
21. See note Ill supra.
22, 394 U.S. at 151.
2ll. 394 U.S. at 153.
24. 394 U.S. at 153.
25. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 1159 (1944), quoted at 394 U.S. at 149.
26. 394 U.S. at 15ll.
27. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 281 Ala. 542, 546, 206 S.2d 348, ll52
(1967), quoted at 394 U.S. at 154.
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the Alabama court for a number of contorted reasons,28 but did
gratuitously "assume ... that the ordinance as now authoritatively
construed would pass constitutional muster," 29 subject to the admonition that "[t]he validity of this assumption would depend upon,
among other things, the availability of expeditious judicial review of
the Commission's refusal of a permit."30 The cryptic phrase "other
things" almost certainly must refer to other procedural safeguards
such as the right to an administrative hearing,31 to the absence of
additional criteria unrelated to competing public uses such as the
content of the message and past conduct of the applicants,32 or to
the absence of a history of administrative abuse. The most plausible
reading of Shuttlesworth, therefore, is that the competing public
uses sufficient to justify refusal of a permit for a mass demonstration
need be characterized in terms no more specific than "convenience"
and quantified in terms no more precise than "undue disturbance."
In practical terms, the combined import of Cox and Shuttlesworth
is to give the ultimate decision-maker virtually unfettered discretion
in deciding the issue of resource allocation. This approach does not
necessarily run afoul of the strong principle against unlimited administrative discretion when free speech is involved,33 for the ultimate decision-maker can be the local court, an appellate court, or
even the United States Supreme Court, depending on the correlative
constitutional doctrines concerning expeditious judicial review34 and
self-help.35 Although it can be argued that in this politically charged
area discretionary power that could never be entrusted to city officials may properly be given to the courts, the dangers inherent in
judicial discretion-potential for abuse, diminished constitutional
legitimacy36-make principled, doctrinal judicial review a preferable
28. The primary reasons that the Court refused to recognize this gloss were because
it came too late-after the events that gave rise to the prosecution, the trial, and the
charge to the jury-and because the Birmingham officialdom-in the person of Bull
Connor-had acted upon a quite different reading of the statute. On this problem of
judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 891-901 (1970); Comment, Judicial Rewritings of Overbroad Statutes: Protecting the Freedom of Association from Scales to Robel, 57 CALIF.
L. REv. 240 (1969).
29. 394 U.S. at 155.
30. 394 U.S. at 155 n.4.
31. See text accompanying notes 273-82 infra.
32. See pt. II. B. infra (message) and pt. II. E. infra (past conduct).
33. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965).
34. See text accompanying notes 252-62 infra.
35. See pt. III. E. infra.
36. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); C. BLACK, JR.,
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment
on the Two-Level Theory of Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640 (1965).
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solution. Certainly the variables are too nµmerous and the judgments
are too subtle to make feasible-at any level of decision-making-any
kind of "definitional" or "per se" methodology. It is possible, however, that legal methods intermediate in the spectrum between absolute discretion and per se rules-balancing a finite number of
previously legitimated factors; enforcement of an equal protection
standard; and evaluation of reasonable alternatives-can provide a
better means of dealing with the problem than the Court's present
essentially discretionary approach.

I. Controlled Balancing
While discretionary decision-making calls for a balancing of all
relevant considerations, "balancing" as a methodological term of
art refers to a more controlled, artificial, inflexible, fragmented, less
easily abused process whereby the decision concerning which factors
will be cognizable and how they shall be weighted is made beforehand, without reference to a specific factual dispute. 37 For example,
37. All legal reasoning is "balancing" in the sense that value conflicts can be intelligently resolved only by adding up the pros and the cons of the competing positions.
The important methodological question concerns the level of generality at which the
value resolution should take place. Thus, an absolutist can argue that "on balance,"
considering not only the value of speech and the conflicting governmental interest in
regulation, but also such factors as judicial economy and legitimacy, it is best never to
allow punishment for "speech" but to pose few constitutional barriers to punishment
for "conduct." Even then, the absolutist must define "speech" and "conduct," which
he may do, for example, by deciding that, "on balance," it is best always to consider
black armbands "speech" and face-to-face epithets "conduct." Others may favor a lower
level of generality. They may argue that the value of speech, the conflicting governmental interest, the adjudication cost, the enforcement feasibility, the chilling effect,
and other elements vary so much that a value resolution at the abstract level of "speech"
and "conduct" is too unresponsive to the underlying competing values to be desirable.
They may suggest a different per se formula for each general area of speech controversy: for example, obscenity ("appeals to the prurient interest, patently offensive,
utterly without redeeming social value''); libel ("with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not''); subversive membership (''knowing, active membership, with specific intent to forward unlawful goals''); advocacy
("directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action''). Still others may suggest that even these specially tailored tests
are too abstract and unresponsive, and that a better approach is to weigh and resolve
the conflicting values in each case. At the lowest level of generality, this process calls
for the decision-maker to engage in a pristine utilitarian calculus for each fact situation
-in short, to exercise discretion. A level of generality somewhat higher than discretion
but lower than the per se tests can be achieved by limiting the number of admissible
variables on the ground that whatever would be gained in responsiveness to underlying
values by considering other relevant variables would be lost in complexity, cost, timeconsumption, and potential for abuse. Similarly, the admissible variables-at this point
only general concepts-may be assigned static weights if it is thought that a case-bycase valuation process would be too complicated or too heavily influenced by personal
factors. This latter methodology of limited variables and fixed weights is what is meant
herein by the term "balancing." See generally Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U.
CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967); Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the
Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755 (1963); Note, Civil Disabilities
and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842 (1969).
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using a balancing approach, a city official ruling on a permit request
would not need to take evidence on every conceivable dislocation and
annoyance and indirect economic effect of a demonstration, and then
try to weigh them against his assessment of the particular speech
value of the demonstration both to participants and to recipients of
the message. Instead, pursuant to an appellate court ruling, he might
assign a fixed speech value to all demonstrations and then consider
on the other side of the balance only a limited number of quantifiable variables such as traffic flow, parking, access to buildings, and
pedestrian passage. A significant advantage of such a controlledbalancing approach is economy, both in terms of the limited proof
that must be marshalled and of the circumscribed analysis that must
be undertaken by the decision-maker; and to the extent that expedited judicial review is deemed important,38 economy should be a
paramount consideration. Balancing also makes the initial decision
more focused and articulated, and thus makes it more easily reviewable on appeal, an important consideration if hostility, myopia, or
mediocrity are problems at the level of initial decision-making. Since
the need for effective appellate review is especially great in the case
of permit denials, 39 these advantages of economy and visibility would
seem to outw-eigh the chief drawbacks of balancing-the rigidity and
artificiality of the process.
But is it possible, within an acceptable range of artificiality, to
reduce the factors involved in the terribly complex resource allocation decision to a few variables? And is it possible to develop a common unit of measurement for weighing the value of speech against
the value of competing public uses? It would seem to be a fool's
errand to attempt to calibrate ideas-or to assign a weight at any
level of generality to the value of a given message. There is, however,
a common denominator in the value conflict, and that is people. One
man's personal satisfaction in demonstrating can be balanced against
another man's inconvenience caused by the demonstration. In a
constitutional system that has a strong commitment to the importance.of speech, it can safely be said that one man's interest in speech
is at least as important as another's substantial inconvenience and
much more important than another's minor inconvenience.
This dichotomy benv-een substantial and minor inconvenience
can serve to limit the number of factors in the balancing process.
The decision-maker can ignore those who suffer only minor incon38. See text accompanying notes 252-62 infra,
39. See text accompanying notes 252-72 infra.
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venience (arguably as a trade-off for not counting the number of
people who will be indirectly and perhaps involuntarily benefited
by hearing the message), and then weigh the expected number of
demonstrators against the number of people who will be substantially
inconvenienced. Furthermore, substantial inconvenience can be reduced, again somewhat arbitrarily, to a finite number of forms: (1)
serious delay in driving caused by a predictable traffic jam or lengthy
detour; (2) loss of a parking place within three blocks of destination;
(3) loss of access to one's destination; (4) lengthy (at least three blocks)
pedestrian detour; (5) dramatic increase in the noise level in an area
ordinarily distinctive for its quietude. Minor inconvenience could be
considered in the balancing process in one exceptional circumstance:
if the number of people likely to suffer minor physical inconvenience
in the use of the public ways were grossly disproportionate to the
number of demonstrators, then the speech could be prohibited. Thus,
a solo zealot could be denied the right to commandeer even a minor
intersection if several motorists would have to be slightly rerouted,
and could even be denied the right to use a square or plaza should
the number of loafers in search of serenity greatly exceed those in
search of enlightenment.
Critics of this balancing formula might argue that it is untrue to
the spirit of the first amendment to define free speech according to
the size of the protesting faction, and also that there is no reliable
way of predicting the size of a crowd or the num~er of people who
will be substantially inconvenienced. It undoubtedly would be irrational to regulate the content of speech on the basis of numbers, since
the worth of an idea is likely to bear little correlation to the number
of persons who can be enlisted in its support. For the resource
allocation aspect of speech regulation, however, the speech value at
stake is not the survival of the idea but the personal satisfaction of
physical participation, the sum total of which will bear at least a
linear correlation to the size of the demonstration.40
Prediction and proof would be difficult under the balancing formula suggested above, but probably not so difficult as under the
Supreme Court's present discretionary approach (assuming that discretion, to be defensible, must be exercised on the basis of information and analysis rather than prejudice, whim, or inertia). Under the
suggested controlled-balancing approach, the applicants would have
40. Probably the correlation will be greater: the satisfaction that one person ex•
periences from being part of a crowd of fifty is usually not as great as his satisfaction
in being part of a crowd of several thousand; with each increment to the group there
will be more people, each enjoying the event more.
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to bear the burden of proving their numerical claims. Relevant evidence would include membership strength, past participation in
similar demonstrations, predictions of crowd size by reporters and
police officers, and, most persuasively, affidavits of intent to participate. The city would have the burden of proof on the issue of
substantial inconvenience. In most cases, traffic flow data would already be on hand; in addition, specific traffic, pedestrian, and parking
surveys could be taken without much trouble or expense. Estimates
of inconvenience made by city officials in granting permits to groups
who express more "acceptable" ideas would be highly relevant.
A final reason for preferring the controlled-balancing approach
is that it is an ideal methodology for introducing into the decisionmaking process a most significant and too frequently overlooked variable: duration. A one-hour interruption of the normal routine can
have a certain festive air; it can give the demonstrators their physical
outlet, their showing of numerical strength, their discovery of unity,
or their thirty seconds of television exposure. A longer event can
wear down the patience of police and onlookers, can give hecklers
time to round up support, and can lead to disruptive acts by protestors attempting to reverse a sagging momentum. Numerical balancing would be uniquely sensitive to the duration factor because the
number of expected demonstrators would remain constant while the
number of people seriously inconvenienced would vary directly with
the proposed length of the demonstration-a two-hour demonstration
might be protected whereas a four-hour assemblage of identical size
and character might not.

2. Equal Protection
Controlled balancing would also greatly facilitate enforcement
of an equal protection standard,41 since under the balancing approach
manageable comparisons between different demonstrations could be
made for the first time. Presently, rejected applicants find it very
difficult to make a persuasive equal protection claim unless a comparable group has previously been granted a permit for the same
type of demonstration over the same route for the same duration at
the same time of the day and week. The numbers game of controlled
balancing would provide a common currency for a much broader
range of comparisons.
41. If an equal protection standard were desirable it could be rooted in either the
general command of the fourteenth amendment or in the embryonic concept of "first
amendment equal protection" suggested in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31
(1968).

August 1970]

Prior Restraints on Demonstrations

1493

But before stampeding on to the administrative details, it is
necessary to consider whether the equal protection principle should
be applicable at all to the resource allocation decision. If unpopular
groups are protected to the extent of the controlled balance, should
not the municipality have the option of giving some groups a larger
share of public resources than is constitutionally required without
thereby binding itself to similar allocations for other groups at other
times? In this regard, the equal protection principle may actually
conflict with the free speech interest, since a rigid most-favored-group
guaranty might result only in fewer and smaller parades by the
Shriners, the Little League, and the American Legion-a net loss to
the community in terms of expression and the satisfaction of personal
participation.
There are few precedents on this touchy dilemma, primarily because the requisite equal protection comparison is difficult to make
in the absence of an artificial measuring system such as the controlled
balance. It is settled that a municipality cannot declare an area absolutely off limits to one group and then allow other more popular
groups to speak there; 42 but such a situation is a separate problem
since the all-or-nothing aspect makes the classification according to
ideology especially debilitating, the claimed regulatory need especially unpersuasive, and the inequality especially visible. Governments can no longer distribute benefits like teaching positions,43
civil service jobs,44 and tax exemptions45 on the basis of ideological
affinity, but a major reason for that doctrine is the empirical assumption that such a distribution scheme would have an over-all inhibiting effect on expression.46 This may be a doubtful assumption
42. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 272-73 (1951). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965); Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d
83, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Resistance v. Commissioners of Fairmount Park, 298 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881, 885
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (attempt to ban "hippies" from a public square: "the law may not
suppress one class of idlers in order to make a place more attractive for other idlers
of a more desirable class'); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp.
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434
P .2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.
2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
43. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). See generally Israel, Elfbrandt
v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 193.
44. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
45. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
46. See Israel, note 43 supra; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Note, The Chilling
Effect of the Constitutional Law, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
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when applied to demonstrations, both because a demonstrator is not
likely to be deterred from expressing himself by the fear of losing
incremental (over and above the controlled-balance) privileges and
also because of the possibility, mentioned above,47 that a strict equal
protection rule would be counter-productive in terms of the sum total
of demonstrating.
General fourteenth amendment principles may provide some direction in determining whether and to what extent equal protection
principles should be applied to demonstrations.48 The courts tend
to exercise more "active" scrutiny over classifications when the interests at stake are deemed "fundamental"49 or when the classifying
criteria undercut values that are recognized by other constitutional
provisions. 50 Also, active scrutiny would seem to be more warranted
when the classification is the work of nonelective officials51 and when
such scrutiny would not bring on a caseload inconsistent with an
intelligent allocation of scarce judicial resources. 52 Active review is
not, however, to be equated with unconstitutionality; rather it is a
judicial insistence that the importance of the objective sought to be
achieved by the classification be apparent and that alternative, less
drastic measures for achieving that objective be employed if at all
possible.
In applying this analysis to the problem of permit administration,
it would be straining somewhat to call the interest in incremental
demonstrating "fundamental." 53 While a classification according to
47. See text preceding note 42 supra.
48. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
49. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right of the criminally accused to a proper defense).
50. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial discrimination).
51. When a court reviews a classification made by nonelective officials, the (largely
specious) arguments about deference to legislative judgment, effective remedies at the
ballot box, and the need to allow flexibility for legislative compromising and logrolling,
have no applicability.
52. This may explain the Supreme Court's seeming reluctance to do anything about
the gross inequality inherent in most educational financing schemes. See Mcinnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); J. COONS, w. CLUNE &: w. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
53. This is not to disparage the importance of demonstrating nor to imply that the
interest in demonstrating that goes into the controlled balance is not entitled to great
weight. The point is simply that the interest in getting more than the controlled balance would allocate cannot compare to the interests at stake in the voting and criminal
defense cases. Language in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), suggests that all
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ideology would certainly seem to undercut first amendment values,
a classification according to a reasonable apprehension of violence
might not. The fact that the permit decision is usually made by nonelective officials would seem to favor active review of the decision.
While a strict equal protection standard would not lead to the initiation of many new cases, it would, nevertheless, severely complicate
existing litigation. Factual disputes would rage, not only over the
immediate planned event, but also over the proper estimates for past
uncontested demonstrations. This problem of proof could be minimized by accepting the city's recorded estimates of participation and
inconvenience for all permits voluntarily granted, but such a doctrine might require the city to keep records against its will and in
any event would probably only result in inflated estimates of expected Legionnaires and correspondingly deflated estimates of the
inconvenience created by their parades.
There would be other complicating factors in using the equal
protection analysis. If 100 Little Leaguers were allowed seriously to
inconvenience 200 people, would that necessarily compel the conclusion that 500 Weathermen must be allowed to inconvenience 1,000
people? Shouldn't happy New Yorkers lining the parade route to
watch the Mets or the astronauts be counted as participants rather
than spectators? If so, should apathetic New Yorkers watching Hubert
Humphrey or disgruntled New Yorkers watching the Vietnam Moratorium be accounted for in a similar fashion? Moreover, suppose that
the city decides that the last Shriners' parade was too bothersome and
that it wants to reverse its resource-allocation policy? These problems
are not insoluble, but they do introduce into the analysis an element
of complexity that ought to weigh in the basic decision whether equal
protection should be applicable at all, and if so, to what extent.
The conclusion seems warranted that, in light of the problems
outlined above, any equal protection scrutiny should be of the passive, "roll-over-and-play-dead" variety currently employed in testing
economic regulations. is4 The applicants' interest in obtaining a refirst amendment interests will be deemed "fundamental" for purposes of triggering
active equal protection scrutiny. It appears, however, that "fundamentality" is to be
determined not by looking to the general subject matter but rather to the incremental
interest asserted, for in McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969),
the Court exercised only passive scrutiny after explaining that although the subject
matter was voting, the incremental interest at stake was "merely" that of obtaining an
absentee ballot. In addition, the fundamentality concept was recently dealt a stultifying blow when the Court refused to consider the interest in receiving welfare allotments sufficient to trigger active equal protection review. Dandridge v. 'Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970).
54. See cases cited in notes 57-59 infra.
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source allocation more favorable than that required by controlled
balancing cannot be placed on a par with voting or receiving an
effective criminal defense, and the complexities of adjudication involved with a more strict standard would forbid the use of such a
standard.
Unequal treatment openly based on ideology may have a ring
quite discordant with that of the first amendment, but even for such
a blatant classification the argument for a more active scrutiny similar
to that accorded racial classifications is less than compelling. Ideological classifications, unlike classifications based on race, sex, and
legitimacy, are not dependent upon an immutable trait beyond the
control of the persons affected by the discrimination. While stigmatization of minority races can serve no legitimate governmental
purpose, stigmatization of minority viewpoints, even to the extent of
vice-presidential epithets, is unavoidable if the government is to have
its day in a robust market place of ideas. Classification according to
race, at least when it disfavors the minority race, violates what may
be termed a moral taboo; classification according to ideology, however, is considered perfectly acceptable in many contexts-handing
out postmasterships, inviting banquet speakers, restoring "balance"
to an economics faculty or a supreme court.
The thrust of this argument should not be misconstrued: the only
point is that classification according to ideology should not be enough
by itself to trigger active equal protection review. When the interests
at stake are fundamental, the review should be active. When the task
is to define the minimum amount of constitutionally protected expression, rather than to assess the significance of the city's granting
an expression surplus to some groups, the review should be active.
Similarly, the review should be active when the ideological classification will have an over-all "chilling effect" on expression. But as
detailed above, 55 none of these factors is present when the issue is
framed in terms of resource allocation beyond that required by controlled balancing.
Even under "passive" equal protection scrutiny, however, a
classification must relate in a plausible way to some legitimate governmental purpose.56 The prevention of violence would certainly qualify
as such a purpose, and under passive review the courts would be loath
to second-guess the city's empirical conclusion that a demonstration
by one group presented a greater potential for violence than did a
demonstration by another. Realistically, passive equal protection
55. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
56. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
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review would be the functional equivalent of no equal protection
scrutiny at all, as a number of would-be barmaids,57 river pilots,58
and opticians59 have found out.
The conclusion that the equal protection principle should not
limit the resource allocation decision has two important drawbacks.
First, with an effective equal protection requirement, municipalities
would be forced to make either honest or biased-toward-expression
estimates for popular demonstrations, and those estimates could in
tum serve as a credibility check against distorted estimates for unpopular groups. With the passive equal protection standard, however,
this check would be sacrificed. Second, legitimating ideological discrimination in granting permits beyond those required to be granted
by the controlled-balancing formula may very well have a spill-over
effect, making bureaucrats more disposed to practice such discrimination in calculating the balance. When all is considered, however,
these consequences are outweighed by the other more positive factors
discussed above, 60 and especially by the paramount value of minimizing the complexity of adjudication in order to facilitate expeditious decision-making at the highest possible level.
3. Reasonable Alternatives

The New Hampshire statute upheld by the Supreme Court in
Cox, as construed by the New Hampshire supreme court, permitted
"such conditions or changes in time, place, and manner as would
avoid disturbance," 61 and the drastically narrowed ordinance whose
constitutionality was assumed in Shuttlesworth gave officials the
power of "prescribing the streets or other public ways which may be
used therefor." 62 In neither case did the Supreme Court call attention
to the problems raised by such provisions, but the fact remains that
the over-all schemes were approved. Thus, Cox and Shuttlesworth
must stand as at least sub silentio declarations that alternative sites
and times are permissible factors to be considered by officials in
ruling upon permit requests. If this is in fact the rule for mass
assemblies, it contrasts dramatically with the prevailing doctrine for
handbills: "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of ex57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
576.
62.

Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
See text accompanying notes 42-55 supra.
State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 146, 16 A.2d 508, 515 (1940), quoted at 312 U.S. at
BmMINGHAM,

Ar.A., ConE § 1159 (1944), quoted at 394 U.S. at 149.
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pression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place .... " 63
A reasonable-alternative approach appears to have several advantages. In terms of the controlled-balancing formula, there is nothing
magical about a narrow outweighing of one side by the other; the
goal should be to ma.ximize the satisfaction of personal participation
and at the same time to minimize the inconvenience to nonparticipants. Moving a demonstration to a different time or place may
accomplish these objectives. Moreover, while it may be necessary for
reasons of economy of adjudication to treat all serious inconveniences
as of the same magnitude,64 the fact is that they will not be. Thus, it
makes sense to allow the city-the party which can best judge the
degree of inconvenience-to dictate the details of the proposed demonstration in order to minimize the magnitude as well as the number of serious inconveniences. An additional dimension of the
reasonable-alternative analysis is the planned distribution of inconvenience. While it may not be unfair to force a particular group of
merchants and commuters to bear the brunt of the inconvenience
caused by one demonstration, a city cannot be blamed for attempting
to shift the burden of inconvenience for the next demonstration to a
different group by changing the time and/ or the place of the proposed demonstration. For a host of reasons which will be discussed
below, the fear of a hostile audience or the possibility (unsubstantiated by proof of specific intent or an immediate background of
violence) that the demonstrators will cause violence should never be
reasons for refusing permits or enjoining assemblies. 611 Consequently,
it is all the more important for a city to minimize the danger of
violence by rerouting the demonstrators away from hecklers and especially volatile or vulnerable areas within the city. Likewise, if applicants cannot be forced to pay in advance the cost of policing their
event, as suggested below,66 the city has a special financial interest
in the details of the demonstration, since the number of police required may vary considerably depending upon the time and place
of the demonstration. In response to the cynical observation that inconvenience, danger, and cost can always be minimized by putting
the demonstrators out in a cow pasture, a principle could be applied
whereby the alternative site and/or time must be, in the opinion of
63. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
64. See text preceding note 40 supra.
65. See pt. II. D. infra (fear of a hostile audience); pt. II. C. infra (specific intent);
pt. II. E. infra (past conduct of the applicant); and pt. II. F. infra (immediate background of violence).
66. See text accompanying notes 176-84 infra.
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the ultimate decision-maker, just as desirable as the applicants' first
choice.
There are, on the other hand, two major problems with a reasonable-alternative approach. First, it is impossible to measure the desirability of a particular time and place by any standard other than the
demonstrators' own subjective values. Can a bureaucrat or a judge
tell the applicants that a particular site really is not all that symbolic
or is not the true locus of their grievance? A related difficulty is that
it smacks of paternalism to have the government dictating the details
of a protest. Certainly a legitimate and important value to be considered in determining the desirability of a reasonable-alternative
approach is the individual satisfaction derived, not just from participation and expression, but from personal, creative, and unprogrammed participation and expression. Demonstrators, of course,
have social obligations, but when the calculus embodied in the
controlled-balancing formula awards them the use of public resources,
they may justifiably chafe at having to make further sacrifices in the
name of the public interest, especially if the utilitarian fairness of
the controlled balance is at the same time used as a reason for not
employing a meaningful equal protection standard in deciding the
resource allocation question. 67
The second major problem with a reasonable-alternative approach is the omnipresent one of complexity and cost of adjudication.
The magnitude of this problem, however, can be overestimated. A
reasonable-alternative analysis would not complicate litigation nearly
so much as would an active equal protection analysis since, under
the former, the inquiry would.be limited to a few alternative sites
and times proposed by the city, and the only question would be
whether any of those sites and times was as desirable as the applicants'
first choice. On the other hand, a determination of the relative
desirability of a number of sites and times could be a substantial
task. The variables are many: symbolic importance, comfort, likeli. hood of attracting media coverage, size and character of the probable
group of bystanders, transportation and parking facilities for the
assembling demonstrators, time convenience of the demonstrators in
light of work, school, and child care commitments. The weighing
process could be simplified somewhat by making conclusive the city's
judgment that the alternative sites and times would be preferable in
terms of the variables of public inconvenience, danger, and cost, but
in that event the demonstrators might fairly ask why their judgment
67. See text accompanying netes 42-60 supra.
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concerning desirability should not likewise be conclusive for the
variables that concern them.
A final factor in the equation is the degree to which the advantages of the reasonable-alternative approach can be realized without
burdening the adjudication process with the complexities inherent
in such an approach. Municipalities could be required never to reject
applications outright, and always to offer alternative sites and times, 08
except, of course, if it could be shown that the demonstrators had a
specific intent to cause violence. 69 There would be a number of incentives for applicants to accept the proffered alternatives. Against
the incremental desirability of demonstrating at the time and place
of their first choice, demonstrators would weigh the delay, energy,
cost, and risk of defeat involved in forcing the city into court-discounted by any harassment and cause celebre advantages that litigation might offer.
Although the factors weigh heavily on each side, and the question
is an extremely close one, it appears that the first amendment
controlled-balancing determination should not be affected by the
presence or absence of alternative sites and times. Again, the decisive
factor is complexity of adjudication. If expedited judicial review is
to function effectively, it cannot be stressed enough how important
it is to keep the evidence manageable and the inquiry focused.
The factor of complexity of adjudication works to the disadvantage of the applicants in one respect. While the decision-maker, at
each level, should be required to sweeten a rejection with an offer of
a reasonable alternative, the applicants should not be entitled to
institute new proceedings to test the optimality of the alternative
offering. They should be entitled to a ruling on precisely the event
they wish to stage; if they play their hand too boldly they should have
to settle, no questions asked, for the safe alternative offered by the
6~. For example, a New York City Department of Parks regulation provides:
"Whenever a permit is denied by reason of (b), (c) or (d) above [location or time not
suitable], alternative suitable locations and dates shall be offered to the applicant."
See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 286, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 41 (1961). In Yenofsky v. Silk, 305 F. Supp. 991 (D. Mass. 1969), the court listed as one of its reasons for
granting the applicants' prayer the fact that the city had failed to offer an alternative
route.
69. Even a background of violence would not relieve the city from the obligation
to offer an alternative. See pt. II. F. infra. I£ such a background were shown by proof
of immediate past violence (see text accompanying notes 155-56 infra), the city could
offer an alternative site where there had been no violence. If the background were
proven by the imposition of a general curfew (see text accompanying note 157 infra),
the city could offer a site outside the curfew area or, if the curfew were city-wide, an
alternative time when the curfew would not be in effect; if necessary, a time as
indefinite as "the first day after the curfew is lifted" could be offered to the applicants.
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decision-maker-while retaining, of course, the right to appeal to a
higher tribunal the rejection of their first choice. Not only would
this procedure limit adjudication costs, it would also give the applicants an incentive to bargain with the city over alternative times
and routes, since they might arrive at a more desirable alternative
through negotiation with the city than would be offered them by the
ultimate decision-maker as a consolation prize after he rejected their
initial proposal.
4. Per Se Restrictions on Place, Time, Size, and Duration
In certain situations, the use of per se rules may provide a workable approach for dealing with the problems presented by demonstration permit cases. In view of the undoubted importance of minimizing adjudication time and costs and of limiting the opportunity for
administrative abuse, per se restrictions should be favored whenever
feasible. For most demonstration permit disputes, however, the number of critical variables is so great that per se restrictions are simply
too artificial and too unresponsive to the underlying competing
interests. Thus, controlled balancing usually-although not alwaysrepresents a better accommodation between realism and economy. In
certain instances, however, per se restrictions regarding place (for
example, never on an expressway), time (never between 4:00 p.m.
and 7:00 p.m., Monday through Friday), duration (never longer than
three hours) and size (never more than 1,000 marchers) may produce
results not markedly different from the controlled balance; and these
results could be achieved at a substantial savings in terms of the
energy, time, and money devoted to making the decision.
The basic question is how much deviation from the controlledbalancing results should be tolerated in the name of economy. If
the deviation were neutral, in the sense that it adversely affected the
regulatory interest approximately as often as the speech interest,
the inquiry would be reduced to weighing the artificiality of the
process (neutral but nonetheless undesirable) against the adjudication savings. This neutrality would be possible if the regulatory
scheme consisted entirely of per se restrictions-for example, no
demonstrations on Sundays, on weekdays between 4:00 p.m. and
7:00 p.m., and on Main Street, all other requests granted regardless
of how much inconvenience would be caused thereby-but then only
if the per se restrictions were such that the number of applications
"improperly" (in terms of the controlled balance) granted roughly
equalled the number of applications "improperly" denied. In practice, however, per se restrictions would always complement rather
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than replace the balancing calculus; either would be a sufficient
predicate for refusing to issue a permit since no municipality would
be likely to gamble on the adequacy of a totally per se scheme. Thus,
the deviation from the controlled-balancing results would always
favor the regulatory interest.
With the burden, in terms of deviation from the controlledbalancing results, falling entirely on the speech interest, per se restrictions should be upheld only if that burden is kept to a relatively low
level-that is, only if for a very high percentage of the anticipated
(not hypothetical) requests governed by the per se restriction the
controlled-balancing measure would likewise require rejection. 70
Probably, only per se restrictions combining the factors of place and
time-of-day (never on Main Street between 4:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.
on weekdays) would be able to pass this test. On the other hand,
cities could still declare certain publicly owned properties to be
"functionally private" and thus not open to the general public; 71
the above limitation would cover only per se restrictions with respect
to demonstrations in "functionally public" places.72
Per se restrictions should also be limited by an active equal
protection standard. The reasons for not insisting on equal protection
with respect to the balancing calculus73 are not present in the case
of per se restrictions. Adjudication would not be complicated: did
the city let the Shriners use Main Street or didn't it? Moreover, the
uncertainty of how to regard the happily inconvenienced onlookers
at a popular parade would not complicate the determination of unequal treatment. Furthermore, the issue is not wide-open as a matter
70. Prophylactic regulations of speech are highly suspect. See Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 286, 379 P.2d
481, 487, 29 Cal. Rptr. I, 7 (1963), the California supreme court found an ordinance
which prohibited all sound trucks moving at less than IO m.p.h. to be in violation of
the first amendment. The court stated: "Its [the ordinance's] reach is not limited to
the prohibition of a sound truck which impedes the flow of pedestrian and vehicular
traffic or which creates a dangerous traffic situation. Rather it sets up a blanket prohibition against the use of a stationary sound truck. The provision fails because, assuming its valid police purpose, it proceeds beyond that which is necessary." See also
Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Commonwealth v. Guess, 168
Pa. Super. 22, 76 A.2d 500 (1950).
71. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (a jailyard).
72. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (privately owned shopping center held to be "functionally public'1; In re
Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 775, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969); Schwartz-Torrance
Inv. Corp. v. Baker &: Confectionery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394
P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964). See also Wolin v. Port of New York Authority,
268 F. Supp. 855, 860 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 392 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); In re
Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P .2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
73. See text accompanying notes 42-55 supra.
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of precedent, since several cases have already applied an active equal
protection standard to per se restrictions. 74
In summary, it is beyond dispute that some competing public
uses justify permit denials for and injunctions against demonstrations. The doctrinal debate is over how those uses must be characterized, measured, proved, and weighted. Thus far, the courts have
failed to fashion any meaningful standards to deal with these problems; the prevailing shibboleth-"undue disturbance of public convenience"-amounts to no more than a gra..."lt of discretionary authority to the ultimate decision-maker.
The first amendment should be interpreted to mean that a
demonstration must be allowed whenever the probable number of
demonstrators exceeds the number of citizens who would be seriously
inconvenienced by the march or rally. Minor inconvenience caused
by the demonstration should not be considered unless the number of
minor inconveniences is grossly disproportionate to the number of
protestors, in which case the event could be prohibited. Should
municipalities choose to allow some gatherings that would not qualify under this numerical balancing formula, there should be no constitutional requirement that less popular groups be given equal
treatment. By the same token, demonstrations which qualify for approval under the numerical balancing standard should not be denied
such approval on the ground that an alternative site or time would
be less inconvenient. Finally, per se restrictions regarding place, size,
and duration should pass constitutional muster only if, for a very
high percentage of the anticipated requests denied because of the per
se rule, the numerical balancing formula would likewise support
rejection.
B. The Message of the Demonstration

It is easy enough to proclaim that "censorship" must not be
practiced-that the demonstrators' ideas can never be factors in refusing a permit or granting an injunction. But what if the message
of the demonstration is obscene, libelous (even after New York
Times Company v. Sullivan 75 ), an invasion of privacy, or consists of
"fighting words"?76 'What if the message is commercial and thus not
entitled to the full panoply of first amendment protection?77 What
74.
75.
76.
77.

See cases cited in note 42 supra.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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if the demonstrators' message is a relevant factor for predicting the
size and behavior of the crowd or the likelihood of hecklers? 78
The general problem area of prior content regulation of speech
is, to a large extent, a doctrinal wasteland. In Near v. Minnesota 10
the Supreme Court struck down an injunction against "malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory" 80 publications and waxed eloquent on
the general evils of prior restraints; but the opinion also emphasized
that the particular scheme at issue placed the burden on the publisher to establish both truth and good motive. Moreover, in acknowledging that the constitutional ban on prior restraints is not
absolute, the Court proffered a far-reaching dictum:
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar
grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced
against obscene publications. The security of community life may be
protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government.81

Thirty years later, in Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago,82 the Court cited this dictum in refusing to fashion a constitutional principle that would completely prohibit content regulation
of films at the prior-restraint stage, although the opinion noted that
motion pictures were not "necessarily subject to the precise rules
governing any other particular method of expression." 83 The Supreme Court has never spoken to the precise problem of prior regulation of demonstrations based on the proposed message of the
demonstrators. The lower courts appear to be divided in this area,84
and no lower court opinion has contributed a very helpful analysis.
From the standpoint of efficiency, it makes sense for a city to
regulate the content of a demonstration before the event. The dam78. See City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d (1961).
79. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
80. 283 U.S. at 706.
81. 283 U.S. at 716.
82. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
83. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952), quoted at 365 U.S.
at 49.
84. Compare Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969);
Resistance v. Commissioners of Fairmount Park, 298 F. Supp. 961, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Snyder v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927, 936 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 282-83, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 36 (1961); with
Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp.
963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 1969); East Meadow Community Concerts Assn. v. Board of
Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 219 N.E.2d 172 (1966).
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age done by libelous, privacy-invading, or violence-inciting speech
is often irreparable; preventing the speech from ever working its
harm is better both for the putative victims and for the speakers, who
are faced only with permit denials and injunctions rather than
criminal convictions. A prior-restraint mechanism is also the most
efficient means of informing demonstrators who wish to stay within
the bounds of protected expression exactly where that elusive line is.
A prior seal of approval may also help the demonstrators to recruit
pillar-of-the-community types to give their event more political
selling p·ower. In addition, permit and injunction decisions may already be influenced by expectations regarding content, so that formal
submission of the planned speeches and signs would be an improvement over a system of uninformed and paranoic guesswork by city
officials and judges. With expedited judicial review of permit denials,
as advocated below,85 the primary danger of prior restraints-the
fact that professional censors are likely to reach results quite different
from those which judges would reach-can be significantly reduced;
moreover, this danger is not present at all when the prior restraint
takes the form of an injunction. Thus, if the various burdens of
initiation, going forward, and proof are placed on the government,
again as advocated below,86 the argument against prior content regulation of demonstrations must rely essentially on the impracd.calities of enforcement.
Prior submission of the content of a film is easy; all that is necessary is to schedule an advance showing for the censors. Speeches, on
the other hand, tend to be written the night before or, more frequently, improvised on the spot from scribbled outlines. Placards
and banners usually are produced in an uncoordinated, do-it-yourself
fashion. Generalized descriptions of content (for example, "to protest
the war") seldom provide enough information to support findings
of unlawful advocacy, libel, invasion of privacy, or obscenity, although in certain cases they may: for example, "will read the names
of war dead" ;87 "will read from the private correspondence of Grayson Kirk"; 88 "will culminate with a massive draft-card turn-in"; 89
"will present a nude couple making love." 00 General statements of
85. See text accompanying notes 252-62 infra.
86. See text accompanying notes 249-51 infra (initiation); and text accompanying
notes 226-35 infra (going forward and proof).
87. Arguably, this would be an invasion of privacy.
88. Id.
89. But see Resistance v. Commissioners of Fairmount Park, 298 F. Supp. 961, 963
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
90. Such action clearly would be a violation of most municipal obscenity statutes.
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content are also usually adequate to identify purely commercial exhibitions. But for the most part, any consideration of content at
the permit application stage could easily be thwarted by applicants
careful enough to keep their demonstrations unstructured, disorganized, or spontaneous. Any attempt to coerce specificity by means of
an obligation of full disclosure and a continuing duty to report plans
as they progress would most likely be unenforceable, and would
surely be a considerable annoyance both to city bureaucrats and to
protestors.
Thus, rather than injecting these difficult content issues into
the permit application process and thereby putting a premium on
vague and evasive applications, a preferable approach would be to
develop a general constitutional ban on prohibiting a demonstration
because of the proposed message, subject to two caveats: (I) the proposed message, though not the demonstration, could be enjoined; and
(2) a proposed commercial message could support the refusal of a
permit.
The injunction-against-content alternative would have a number
of virtues: the initial decision would always be made by a judge; the
permit decision based on the permissible criteria would be separated
from and not delayed by reversals and remands concerning the content factor; and the individuals who transgressed the bounds of protected speech could be punished for contempt without jeopardizing
the rights of those who wished to engage in lawful assembly and
expression. While there are maxims to the effect that "equity will
not enjoin a crime"91 and "equity will not enjoin defamation," 92
these doctrines are riddled with exceptions,93 are of dubious wisdom
in the first place,94 and, in any event, are surmountable by legislation
or judicial decree.
On the other hand, although allowing the assembly and prohibiting parts of the message might or might not increase the likelihood
of defiance of the restrictions by the demonstrators, such a procedure
would certainly increase the danger of harmful defiance: a crowd,
composed in part of those who would not have come had the whole
assembly been prohibited, would be on hand to be incited to riot or
to resist the draft, or to hear the forbidden defamation, obscenity,
E.g., DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 39-1-26 (Supp. 1969); CHICAGO, !LL., MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 192-7 (1963).

91. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAR.v. L. REv. 994, 1013-19
(1965).
92. Id. at 1008-12.
93. Id. at 1013-16.
94. Id. at 1016-18.
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or invasion of privacy. Also, it can be argued that a nation whose
heritage includes the Debs case95 and the other judicial outrages that
led to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act96 should be somewhat wary about encouraging the injunction as a method of regulating the conduct of unpopular groups, especially since there is seldom
time for appellate review of the constitutionality of an injunction,
and since disobedience of a court order is punished in many instances
without the right to a jury trial. 97 On the other hand, when regulation speaks only to content, the facts will seldom be in dispute, so
that the jury's role would be minimal in any event. Furthermore,
adequate appellate review would be possible if, as advocated below,98
protestors who made every reasonable effort to vacate an injunction
could disobey it without losing the right to challenge its constitutionality in defense to contempt citations.
On balance, the advantages of the injunction-against-content
method of regulation seem to outweigh the drawbacks. Except in the
case of commercial demonstrations, the proposed message of a demonstration should be individually enjoinable but should never be a
factor in denying permit requests or in prohibiting entire assemblies
by injunction.
The commercial exception is desirable both in terms of first
amendment theory and enforceability. Whether one considers the
relevant model for free speech analysis to be the intent of the Founding Fathers, the rational dialectic, access to the media, democratic
participation, or release of the id, speech motivated by and tailored
to the desire to sell a product would seem to fall outside the ambit
of concern. The line is not always easy to draw, but the Supreme
Court has ·wrestled with some of the close cases: it has held, for example, that political advertising,99 soliciting for nonprofit causes,100
bookselling,101 and film exhibition102 are entitled to.full first amendment analysis, but that advertising of nonartistic products103 and
soliciting for profit104 are not. Moreover, the difficulties with speci95. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
96. 29 u.s.c. §§ 101·15 (1964). See generally F. FRANKFURTER &: N. GREEN, THE
WllOR INJUNCTION (1930).
97. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
98. See text accompanying notes 331-49 infra.
99. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
101. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
102. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
103. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
104. Breard v.•City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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ficity, spontaneity, and caprice that plague attempts to regulate content in advance would not seem to hinder the simple inquiry whether
the message to be conveyed by the parade or assembly is, in whole or
in part, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, or peddling a
commercial product.
An important question concerning content remains: can a general statement of content be required of the applicants in order to
aid the city in preparing for the event, even though the statement
cannot be a factor in refusing a permit or obtaining an injunction
against the entire demonstration? A vague, general statement of content can serve some useful functions. 105 It can alert the city that the
assemblage will be so controversial as to require extra details of police, who may be specially trained to cope with the demonstrators'
ideological or epithetical taunts. Such a general statement can also
give the city a basis for deciding whether an injunction against content should be sought. Citizens who are not interested in or who are
hostile to the message can be warned ahead of time to absent themselves from the area to avoid becoming part of a captive audience.
All of these functions can be served equally well, however, by requiring a general statement of content after the permit is granted,
when awareness of an unpopular message will not color more "objective" judgments relating to traffic disruption, pedestrian inconvenience, and the like. There may be some occasions when it is in the
interest of a notorious group to let it be known before a permit or
injunction ruling that a particular demonstration is designed to convey a relatively uncontroversial message,106 but this disclosure can be
achieved informally without the need for a blanket obligation to reveal the content of the message before the decision. The constitutional principle should be that, apart from the commercial exception,
a permit can never be denied or an injunction issued simply because
105. No court has held unconstitutional a requirement that applicants for a demonstration permit state their purpose or topic, although in Robinson v. Coopwood, 292
F. Supp. 926, 932 (N.D. Miss. 1968), afjd. per curiam, 415 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1969), the
court held that protestors cannot be compelled to disclose in advance the identity of their
proposed speakers for a rally. Purpose and topic disclosure requirements have been
approved, in dictum or sub silentio holding, in a number of cases. Powe v. Miles, 407
F .2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Resistance v. Commissioners of Fairmount Park, 298
F. Supp. 961, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss.
1969); Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188, 195 (M.D. Ala. 1968), af/d., 412
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207
(1961). See also American Cancer Soc. v. Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 114 N.E.2d
219 (1953), in which the court ordered the issuance of a solicitation license which
city officials had sought to deny on the ground that the purpose of the solicitation was
already being adequately served by previously approved solicitations by other groups.
106. For example, a demonstration by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
protesting pollution.
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the protestors refuse to reveal the content of their demonstration,
but that the permit can be revoked or the injunction granted should
the protestors persist in their refusal after permission to hold the
demonstration has been obtained.
C. The Purpose of the Demonstration
In most cases the purpose of a demonstration is inextricably
entwined with its message. To the extent that this is true, the above
proposals relating to disclosure of content apply as well to purpose.
On the other hand, purpose and message are not always so closely
related. It is no longer a rarity for permit applicants to specifically
intend to engage in or to provoke violence regardless of their supposed "message." Whatever the moral justification for such a response
to a government that is hardly sparing in the deliberate employment
of violence against its political opponents, foreign and domestic, no
rational system of law can afford to condone or facilitate violent behavior. Thus, if it can be proved that the effective leaders of a proposed demonstration have a specific intent to cause violence, whether
directly, or indirectly by provoking the police, there should be no
constitutional prohibition against either enjoining the assemblage or
refusing to grant a permit to the demonstrators.
Legitimating the consideration of intent at the prior-restraint
stage will in all likelihood lead to serious abuses by officials and
judges; such a dangerous principle is advocated only because planned
violence is so very harmful to innocent individuals and to society as
a whole, and is so very prevalent in the contemporary political climate. It is clear that safeguards against such abuse should be carefully
constructed. Only a specific intent to cause violence, directed to the
specific demonstration and manifested by specific plans, should
suffice for a permit refusal or an injunction;107 a general intent extrapolated from rhetoric or previous exploits should not be enough.
Concrete evidence should also be required. In most instances this
evidence would be the testimony of informers willing to drop their
cover and be cross-examined or else recordings from wiretaps and
eavesdropping devices installed pursuant to fourth amendment probable cause standards; documented plans by the demonstrators to
bring equipment such as helmets, baseball bats, and medics would
107. Specific intent is a concept that is as prevalent in first amendment analysis
as it is lacking in refinement. Probably the best way to approach the concept is to
compare the indictments dismissed in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957),
with those remanded for new trials. See also the Court's treatment of the evidence
in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Other helpful discussions may be
found in United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 176-79 (1st Cir. 1969); Z. CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN TIIE UNITED STATES 128-35 (2d ed. 1948).
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also be relevant, though not conclusive, evidence of a specific intent
to cause violence.
It may be argued that a doctrine admitting the relevance of intent but insisting on concrete evidence would provide an added incentive for police to utilize a number of unseemly methods of factfinding. It is unlikely, however, that the mere possibility of a permit
denial would lead to the tapping, bugging, or infiltrating of groups
that would not otherwise be thought to merit such expensive surveillance.
Thus, in cases in which the purpose and the message of a demonstration diverge, proof of specific intent on the part of the applicants
to engage in or provoke violence should be held to be a constitutionally permissible reason for prohibiting an assemblage, either by injunction or permit denial.

D. The Fear of a Hostile Audience
It is a harsh fact of life that the exercise of speech by sincere, wellbehaved protestors is all too often disrupted by roving bands of
toughs. 108 Yet, it is unthinkable that such a "heckler's veto" 100 should
rise to the dignity of a constitutional principle. On the other hand,
it would be almost perverse if the first amendment, with its identity
as a child of the Enlightenment and its imagery of the market place
of ideas, should wind up pointing the nation down the path of confrontation politics by limiting governmental power to prevent moreor-less predictable bloodbaths. While this basic dilemma permeates
all of the hostile-audience cases, it is not always of uniform severity.
The calculus can vary depending, among other things, upon the
number and behavior of the speakers, the nature of the speech, the
availability of police resources, the amount of advance notice of the
demonstration, the presence or absence of spectators sympathetic to
the speakers, the feasibility of identifying the hecklers, and the
location of the confrontation.
In dictum, the Supreme Court has been forthright and bold in
attacking the hostile-audience problem: "Constitutional rights may
not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise . . . ." 110 The holdings on the subject, however, tend to be
108. Probably the most dramatic example of this phenomenon was the recent series
of escapades by the Hard-Hats, a group of New York City construction workers,
against anti-war demonstrators. See N.Y. Times, May 9, 1970, at I, cols. 5-6.
109. The phrase is Professor Kalven's. See H. KAI.VEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST
.AMENDMENT 140-45 (1965).
110. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963), quoted with approval in
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965). Similarly, the Court has stated, "It is
firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of the hearers."
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more evasive, inscrutable, and easily narrowed. In Hague v. CIO,111
for example, a five-man majority held unconstitutional on its face a
scheme providing that "a permit shall only be refused for the purpose
of preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage . . . ." 112
However, only three justices subscribed to the pertinent part of the
one opinion which discussed the problem,113 and that opinion was
careful to point out the many instances in the record of arbitrary
suppression and to note that "the prohibition of all speaking will
undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities."114 Similarly, Fiener v.
New York, 115 the only Supreme Court decision upholding a breachof-the-peace conviction in part because of the threat of a hostile audience, was carefully qualified. The majority observed that "the ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be
allowed to silence a speaker"116 and stressed that in the case at bar the
police were faced with an ongoing crisis. The majority also noted
that the speaker had "[passed] the bounds of argument or persuasion
and [undertaken] incitement to riot .... " 117
Last term the Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to clarify
the law in this most troublesome area. Gregory v. City of Chicago 118
presented a fact situation that could have come from a law school
examination hypothetical: eighty-five perfectly behaved civil rights
protestors were picketing the home of the mayor of Chicago; a special
detail of some one hundred Chicago policemen were making every
conceivable effort to protect the protestors; a manageable situation
existed for about one hour and then a crisis developed-the hostile
crowd of onlookers from the neighborhood grew suddenly to two
thousand, and eggs, rocks, and bottles were thrown at the demonstrators by hecklers able to lose themselves in the crowd. The police
finally asked the leader of the demonstration, Dick Gregory, to disband his group. He refused, and as a consequence was convicted of
disorderly conduct. The Illinois supreme court affirmed the convicStreet v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), quoted with approval in Bachellar v.
Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970).
lll. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
112. 307 U.S. at 502.
113. There was no opinion of the Court in Hague. Justice Roberts' opinion,
discussing the Jersey City ordinance, was joined in by Justice Black and, in
pertinent part, by Chief Justice Hughes. Justices Stone and Reed joined in the result,
but only on the basis of a carefully detailed alternative theory of jurisdiction and a
carefully maintained cryptic silence on the first amendment issue.
114, 307 U.S. at 516.
115. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
116, 340 U.S. at 320.
117. 340 U.S. at 321.
US. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
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tion after carefully interpreting the Supreme Court precedents and
synthesizing them into a new test:
It is only where there is an imminent threat of violence, the police
have made all reasonable efforts to protect the demonstrators, the
police have requested that the demonstration be stopped and explained the request, if there be time, and there is a refusal of the
police request, that an arrest for an otherwise lawful demonstration
may be made.110
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction with a cryptic four-paragraph opinion that only added to the
doctrinal confusion. One sentence-"[pJetitioners' march, if peaceful
and orderly, falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the
First Amendment"120--can be read to resolve with a flick of the
·wrist not only the hostile-audience problem in all its complexity but
also the almost equally difficult issue of residential picketing.121 A
few sentences later, however, the majority seemed to rest its holding
on the conclusion that the record was "totally devoid of evidentiary
support"122 to establish the offense of disorderly conduct. Since the
Illinois supreme court had included in its definition of disorderly
conduct the refusal to obey a police request to stop a demonstration
in the face- of imminent violence amid reasonable police efforts to
contain the audience,123 and since the record amply supported a finding of disorderly conduct as so defined, the "no evidence" holding
of the Supreme Court would seem to be indefensible. It can be explained only by interpreting it as an oblique holding that the Illinois
supreme court's redefinition of disorderly conduct could not be operative, either because it came too late-after the charge to the jury
and the verdict124-or because the presence or absence of a hostile
audience can never be a factor in defining the freedom of speech.
Since the former explanation-the tardiness of the redefinition of
the offense-was listed in the last paragraph of the opinion as an
independent ground for reversal, the most plausible interpretation
of the Gregory holding is that it indeed redeems the promise of
119. Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill. 2d 47, 60, 233 N.E.2d 422, 429 (1968).
120. 394 U.S. at 112.
121. See Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U. L. R.Ev.
177 (1966); Comment, Picketing the Homes of Public Officials, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
106 (1966). See also Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization To Rejuvenate Tenant
Housing, 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969).
122. The doctrine that the Court can reverse a conviction which is not based on any
evidentiary support was initiated in Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
123. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
124. See note 28 supra.
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earlier dicta125 that the hostile audience is a constitutionally impermissible factor to be considered in regulating demonstrations.
In the Court's most recent skirmish with the hostile-audience
problem, Bachellar v. Maryland, 126 it reversed a breach-of-the-peace
conviction because the trial judge's charge to the jury would have
permitted a guilty verdict for, among other things, "conduct of such
nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness
it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment because of
it."127 The Court, speaking with rare unanimity, once more enunciated a clear statement of principle: " '[i]t is firmly settled that
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some
of their hearers' ... or simply because bystanders object to peaceful
and orderly demonstrations."128 It is important to note, on the other
hand, that none of the bystanders in Bachellar had translated his resentment into action, that the Court's general and sweeping language
stopped short of that particular permutation of the problem, and
that the opinion curiously failed to cite Gregory. Nonetheless, it is
probably accurate to read Bachellar as further support for the proposition that audience hostility can never justify a constriction of the
right to assemble.
It would be a mistake, however, to attach much importance to the
Gregory and Bachellar holdings, for surely the hostile-audience problem is too subtle and too important to be conclusively resolved by
the speculative and convoluted implications of those two cases. Perhaps the hostile audience never should be a cognizable factor in
classic free speech locations such as capitol grounds, parks, and major
parade routes, but should be a relevant factor in such sensitive areas
as residential neighborhoods and schoolyards, where many of the
spectators may be "captive."129 In addition, perhaps the problem of
an unexpected and uncontrollable hostile audience ought to justify
some form of minimal, though involuntary, restraint such as placing
the demonstrators in temporary protective custody, although this
solution presents the danger that the minimal nature of the restraint
may lead to its abuse by overly cautious, or personally hostile, police.
125. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
126. 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
127. 397 U.S. at 565 n.3.
128. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), quoted at 397 U.S. at 567.
129. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969), the Court appears to have adopted a test whereby serious disciplinary
problems created by hostile classmates would justify restrictions of speech on school
premises. See also Guzick v. Drebus, 305 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
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Whether or not these suggestions merit acceptance in dealing
with an unanticipated and ongoing hostile mob, the problem is not
so perplexing in the permit application context. Then, the hostile
audience is not an actuality but merely a threat. The threat may be
largely imagined or invented by paranoid or hostile city officials; it
almost certainly will be exaggerated. Even if accurately gauged, the
threat may never materialize, especially if the municipality makes
it clear that it will support the demonstrators in their attempt to
exercise their first amendment rights. Thus, at the permit application
stage, the choice need not be between legalized vigilantism and bloodbath, since the advance notice gives the city an adequate opportunity
to protect the demonstrators-if necessary by requesting the governor to call out the National Guard, which, after all, ought to be
employed as readily to protect human beings exercising their constitutional rights as it is to protect merchandise. In contrast to the
on-the-spot, uncontrollable emergency, it would seem to be a greater
spur to vigilantism and a greater symbolic defeat for free speech if
the legal system were to give in to a threat that could be contained,
albeit by drastic action.
Admittedly, ignoring the threat of a hostile audience in the
permit application context gives rise to some special problems. The
lead time makes possible the emergence of a poker mentality
whereby both the protestors and their opponents may become so
steeped in their own bluffs that they are forced, against their better
judgment, to play their hands. Also, public outrage at property
damage stemming from the demonstration is likely to be greater
when "there was time to prevent it."
These considerations should not, however, obscure the fact that
in the permit application context the essential regulatory interest is
not the prevention of violence, but rather the avoidance of cost-the
cost of adequately policing the event. The weighty factor of violence
prevention can be added to the scales only in diluted form-the
possibility that officials may, even playing it safe, underestimate the
law-enforcement resources that may be needed. This combination of
economizing and fear of miscalculation would seem always to be outweighed by the speech interest, not to mention the interest in avoiding any incentive to vigilante activity. At the very least this is true
when the demonstrators have not unreasonably increased the lawenforcement cost by baiting the hecklers, employing a cast of thousands, or returning to demonstrate for several days in succession.
Moreover, even when these three variables enter the picture and the
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protestors can no longer pose as innocents abroad, it is still preferable
to keep the hostile-audience factor out of the balancing equation,
since limitations more susceptible to objective application-cost
assessments,130 restrictions on repetition,131 emergency curfews132can adequately protect the city's fiscal needs and regulatory interests.
There is no pragmatic need to sacrifice, and indeed there is every
symbolic and administrative reason to preserve, the absolute purity
of the principle already recognized by several lower courts,133 that
the fear of a hostile audience is never to be considered in ruling upon
permit applications or granting injunctions against demonstrations.

E. The Pas_t Conduct of the Applicant
Evidence of past conduct can be highly relevant in predicting the
consequences of allowing a particular demonstration. In the context
of group activity, such evidence can bear not only on the intentions
of the leaders, but also on their ability to control their legions.134 No
doubt, standards of the "good character" genre lend themselves readily to disguised censorship, 135 but that danger can be minimized by
limiting the decision-maker's consideration of past conduct to that
which has been adjudicated in criminal proceedings or at permitrevocation hearings with adequate procedural safeguards. A "moratorium" on demonstrating by those who have previously exceeded the
bounds of legality may be the only effective regulatory weapon
against those demonstrators whose violations are too petty as a matter
of individual fairness or martyr-avoidance strategy to justify incarceration, yet are, from the viewpoint of a well-funded movement,
worth the cost of any fines.
Ironically, it may be that a constitutional ban on considering
past conduct at the prior-restraint stage would be harmful to free
speech. City officials and judges will have impressions about the past
130. See pt. II. H. infra.
131. See text accompanying note 142 infra.
132. See pt. II. F. infra.
133. See, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 977 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Hurwitt
v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp.
100 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1961).
134. Cf. Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 1965), in
which the court stated that a permit cannot be denied simply because the applicants
do not have an established organization.
135. See Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777, 782 (E.D. Tenn. 1969);
Norton v. Ensor, 269 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1967); Evans v. Lepore, 26 N.J. Misc. 215,
59 A.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Borough of Edgewater v. Cox, 123 N.J.L. 212, 8 A.2d
375 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1939); City of Bowling Green v. Lodico, 11 Ohio St. 2d 135, 228
N.E.2d 325 (1967).

1516

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:1481

conduct of would-be demonstrators and are likely to be affected by
those impressions no matter how objective the formal standards for
decision-making may be. It can be argued that legitimating the consideration of properly adjudicated past conduct may satisfy the urge
to take such conduct into account and may also give the applicants
the opportunity to correct any misconceptions that may reside in the
rumor-fed minds of the decision-makers. Also, a prohibition on considering past conduct at the prior-restraint stage might create pressures at other checkpoints to keep potential troublemakers off the
streets. Constitutional supervision may be less effective if the felt
need to control future demonstrations should enter into decisions to
arrest, press charges, set bail, or impose probation conditions.
The Supreme Court has addressed the problem of the consideration of past conduct at the prior-restraint stage only once. The defendant in Kunz v. New York 136 was denied a permit because he had
violated the terms of a previous permit by ridiculing "two great religions. "137 In affirming his conviction for speaking without a permit,
the New York Court of Appeals held that a previous revocation "for
good reasons" is a permissible standard for denying a permit request,
at least when "[t]he commissioner had no reason to assume, and no
promise was made, that defendant wanted a new permit for any uses
different from the disorderly ones he had been guilty of before."138
In reversing the New York court, the Supreme Court limited its
holding to a very narrow ground: since the statute set out no standards for revocation, to use revocation itself as a standard for denying
a permit was simply a two-step process of unbridled administrative
discretion. 139 The Court's dictum, however, was expansive: "[t]he
court below has mistakenly derived support for its conclusions from
the evidence produced at the trial that appellant's religious meetings
had, in the past, caused some disorder. There are appropriate public
remedies to protect the peace and order of the community if appellant's speeches should result in disorder and violence."140 While it
can be argued that the New York court's reliance on past conduct was
unconstitutional only because the permit scheme did not contain
objective standards for considering such conduct, it is significant that
the Supreme Court punctuated its mention of "appropriate public
remedies" with three consecutive references to the distinction be136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

340 U.S. 290 (1951).
People v. Kunz, 300 N.Y. 273, 277, 90 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1949).
People v. Kunz, 300 N.Y. 273, 277-78, 90 N.E.2d.455, 457 (1949).
340 U.S. at 293.
340 U.S. at 294.
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nveen prior restraints and subsequent punishments.141 It is more
natural, therefore, to read the Kunz dictum to stand for the proposition that the denial of a demonstration permit can never be predicated on past conduct, even if that conduct has been adjudicated
with procedural safeguards and seems highly relevant for predicting
future behavior.
An across-the-board prohibition on considering past conduct at the
prior-restraint stage would have one unmistakable virtue: simplicity.
That is no mean credential for a rule of law that must be administered
in many instances by municipal officials with no legal training and
almost always in situations in which passions and paranoia run high
and time is at a premium. Moreover, even if the Court's assertion in
Kunz concerning the adequacy of subsequent punishment must be
viewed with skepticism, it does serve as a telling reminder that this
problem is properly viewed as one part of the monumental debate
over preventive detention: when can the genetic, psychological, sociological, or statistical propability that a citizen will commit a crime in
the future justify punishing him, by incarceration or diminution of
his constitutional rights, before he commits that crime? There is no
need, however, to resolve the past conduct issue on such a simple
plane as the simplicity of a per se rule or on such a complex plane
as the moral propriety of preventive detention. Three intermediate
levels of inquiry can be employed: (1) Is past conduct of consistent
probative value for predicting the consequences of granting permits?
If not, can rules be formulated for isolating the past conduct that is
of predictive value? If not, can the determination safely be committed to administrative discretion? (2) Is there a better stage in the
process of demonstration regulation at which to consider the predictive value of past conduct? (3) How would legitimating the consideration of past conduct at the prior-restraint stage affect administrative behavior at other points in the demonstration regulation
process?
First, it is evident that the predictive value of past conduct fluctuates greatly from case to case. The outcome of each mass gathering
depends upon a myriad of intangible variables: the mood of the
speak.er and of the crowd, the civility of the police, the weather, the
reactions of bystanders, the presence or absence of the media, the
power struggles bet,;veen the various protest leaders, the symbolic
significance of the event, the machinations of agents-provocateur
attempting to discredit the group. In the context of mass demonstra141. 340 U.S. at 294.
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tions, the relevant individual conduct is most often the result of
excitement and overreaction; the criminal liability is frequently of
the vicarious or collective variety-mob action, refusal to disperse,
unlawful assembly, breach of the peace, obstructing public passageways. To predict future behavior on the basis of these indices is to
engage in nothing more than soothsaying.
There are, however, specific individuals or groups for whom this
generalization will not be true: the one-theme religious zealot; the
political martyr-of-the-moment who may be able to ignite the most
volatile passions in his followers merely by stating his cause; the
avowedly violent group such as the Weathermen (whose revolutionary appeal apparently depends on proving that intangible variables
have nothing to do with the outcome of its demonstrations). Were
it possible to legitimate consideration of prior conduct in these exceptional situations without opening up a Pandora's box of administrative discretion, the argument for doing so would be very strong
indeed.
Conceivably, consideration of past conduct could be limited to
convictions for demonstration-related offenses that entail personal
action rather than vicarious or group responsibility-for example,
malicious destruction of property, assault, or resisting arrest. Also,
something like a habitual-offender concept could be employed: three
prior assault convictions might afford a sound basis for predicting
misbehavior at a proposed demonstration whereas one conviction
might not. In addition, a "statute of limitations" of, for instance, two
years might reasonably be adopted so that convictions stemming from
a different protest era would not count against the demonstrators.
One drawback, however, of a rule that would permit this limited
consideration of past conduct at the prior-restraint stage would be
the creation of some undesirable incentives: prosecutors hoping to
prevent future demonstrations would be encouraged to go for convictions rather than to drop charges, and accused demonstrators
hoping to preserve their future options would be encouraged to contest criminal charges rather than plead guilty-both pressures in the
direction of further burdening scarce judicial resources. In addition,
even a carefully circumscribed legitimation of considering past conduct might encourage officials improperly and covertly to consider
other kinds of past conduct such as general reputation, arrests, and
unrelated convictions.
Moreover, even if this circumscribed consideration of past conduct at the prior-restraint stage did not have such serious drawbacks,
there is a preferable alternative: if the right to demonstrate is to be
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limited on the basis of past conduct, this should be done at the
sentencing stage as part of the punishment for the initial conduct.
Incarceration is not the only alternative: should mercy or martyravoidance be of high priority, probation could be conditioned on a
promise by the defendant to refrain from participation in future
demonstrations.142 This control mechanism is not without risks of
its own, the most serious being that its very character as a more
lenient alternative may lead to its careless use by judges and passive
acceptance by defendants.143 But at least the initial decision is always
made by a judge, and always in the course of regular rather than
time-pressured proceedings; there is a fixed duration to the restriction; and the determination is not made with an eye to a specific,
upcoming, and unpopular demonstration. Flexibility can be achieved
by permitting the probation officer to grant a temporary waiver of
the conditions of probation, although this power is likely to be exercised too cautiously to be of much importance. A final consideration is economy. Limiting participation in future demonstrations
at the sentencing stage merely requires one more decision concerning
a defendant already before the court, whereas looking into the past
conduct at the prior-restraint stage may require an enormous extra
expenditure of time. Thus, if consideration of past conduct is ever
to be a control mechanism in regulating demonstrations, it should be
utilized only at the sentencing stage. A permit never should be
denied because of the past conduct of the applicant.
A further reason for this conclusion is that the circumscribed consideration of past conduct would be enforceable only against specific
individuals, not against entire groups-a circumstance that seriously
diminishes the violence prevention advantages that might serve to
justify the consideration of past conduct in the first place. Not only
would it be unfair to deny a group the right to demonstrate merely
because a few of its members had the requisite multiple convictions,
it would also be a futile exercise because front groups could be
created at will. It would be possible to keep multiple offenders off
the speakers' platform-more difficult than to keep them out of the
parade-but it would seem to be difficult to defend on violence
prevention grounds the practice of allowing the group to congregate
while making martyrs of some of its members.
142. This practice raises extremely difficult first amendment questions that are
beyond the scope of the present inquiry. For present purposes it is sufficient to note
that, to date, courts and commentators have found the practice permissible. See
United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1969); Note, Judicial Review of
Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 203-04 (1967).
143. There may also be serious procedural problems in obtaining appellate review.
See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 181, 188-96 (1967).
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F. A Background of Violence
The concerns about message, purpose, hostile audience, and past
conduct all have a common denominator: the fear of violence. In the
year 1970 no extraordinary powers of persuasion are needed to make
the point that the prevention of violence is of the highest priorityindeed it occupies a preferred position-in a civilized society. The
preceding four sections have subdivided this concern about violence
into its component parts, and liave treated them individually. The
conclusions have been heavily influenced by the danger of faulty predictions of violence, whet.lier such predictions are caused by paranoia,
bad faith, laziness, or incompetence. Now violence prevention must
be treated as a cognate concern, not in a context of speculation, but
in one of gruesome actuality. Surely the balancing calculus must
change when protestors walk through a world of broken glass, drawn
bayonets, and tear gas in order to file their permit applications.
The Supreme Court's most direct pronouncement on the matter
is not especially helpful; the Court finds the problem "thorny."144
Cases from another judicial era hold that a governor's declaration of
"martial law" or other invocation of emergency powers, at least if
backed up by an actual deployment of the National Guard, justifies some redefinition of traditional constitutional safeguards, but
"[w]hat are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether
or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial
questions."145 The most extreme case on the subject is ft.foyer v.
Peabody, 146 in which a unanimous Supreme Court gave its blessing
to the preventive detention-2½ months without bail or criminal
charges-of a union leader after labor violence led to the calling out
of troops and the declaration of a state of insurrection. There is no
way of knowing whether the Moyer holding could command a majority of the Court today, or whether an emergency declaration not involving actual military deployment can justify exceptions to normal
Bill of Rights requirements.147
The Court has indicated in the context of labor picketing that,
even in the absence of a formal emergency, a background of violence
is a relevant factor in interpreting the first amendment. The leading
144. Carroll v. President & Commrs., 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
145. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932).
146. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
147. See generally Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560,
1566-68 (1968); Comment, The Riot Curfew, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 450, 486-87 n.202
(1969); Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors' Emergency Powers,
64 MICH. L. REv. 290 (1965).

•
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case, Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Incorporated,148 stands as a reminder that violence, either calculated
or wanton, is hardly a recent arrival on the American political scene:
Besides peaceful picketing of the stores handling Meadowmoor's
products, the master found that there had been violence on a considerable scale. Witnesses testified to more than fifty instances of
window-smashing; explosive bombs caused substantial injury to the
plants of Meadowmoor and another dairy using the vendor system
and to five stores; stench bombs were dropped in five stores; three
trucks of vendors were wrecked, seriously injuring one driver, and
another was driven into a river; a store was set on fire and in large
measure ruined; two trucks of vendors were burned; a storekeeper
and a truckdriver were severely beaten; workers at a dairy which,
like Meadowmoor, used the vendor system were held with guns and
severely beaten about the head while being told to 'join the union';
carloads of men followed vendor's trucks, threatened the drivers, and
in one instance shot at the truck and driver. In more than a dozen
of these occurrences, involving window-smashing, bombings, burnings, the wrecking of trucks, shootings and beatings, there was testimony to identify the wrongdoers ~s union men.149
Against this background of violence, the Supreme Court held that all
picketing, including peaceful picketing, could be enjoined. The
Court noted that "[t]hese acts of violence are neither episodic nor
isolated,"1150 that "it could justifiably be concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past violence would survive even though
future picketing might be wholly peaceful,'' 1151 and that the injunction "is justified only by the violence that induced it and only so long
as it counteracts a continuing intimidation."1152 "Continuing intimidation" was found to exist in spite of the fact that all of the truckseizures and most of the window-smashings and bombings had taken
place three years before the injunction was issued, and the only instances of violence that had occurred in the preceding year were seven
window-smashings and t\vo store-bombings.1153
Moyer, Meadowmoor, and related Supreme Court cases1154 are
helpful on the problem of violence and mass demonstrations only at
148. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
149. 312 U.S. at 291-92.
150. 312 U.S. at 295.
151. 312 U.S. at 294.
152. 312 U.S. at 298.
153. 312 U.S. at 314-15 n.16 Gustice Black, dissenting).
154. E.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (pattern of violence sufficient
to divest NLRB of jurisdiction over on-site picketing not established). See also
United Farm Workers Organization Comm., AFL-CIO v. La Casita Farms, 439
S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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a very high level of generality. It is good to know that the invocations
of martial law and emergency powers support some restrictions on
constitutional liberties, but that the ultimate decision whether to
impose restrictions remains in the hands of the judiciary, and entails
the familiar reconciliation of individual and societal demands. It is
also good to know that speech activities may lose their protected quality if they are related to violent activities in some measure of causality, proximity, and continuity. On the other hand, so much has
transpired in the field of civil liberties since Moyer was decided in
1909, and labor disputes are so focused, so drawn out, and so colored
by economic coercion, that any attempt to apply the narrow holdings
and doctrines of Moyer and other labor cases in the mass-demonstrations context must take on a distinctly Procrustean quality.
Approaching the issue, then, with only the broadest of precedential
guidelines, how can a back.ground of violence be made an admissible
consideration without giving city officials a cornucopia of abusable
discretion? Two checking devices might be employed. The first
would attempt to define a threshold of violence-in terms of intensity, dispersion, geographic and temporal proximity, and continuity
-that must exist before the factor could be considered at all. The
second checking device would be similar in spirit, but would mark
the threshold of admissibility not directly by trying to measure the
violence, but rather indirectly by conditioning any limitation on the
right of assembly on a corresponding willingness by the government
to take other drastic and expensive measures to control the situation,
such as calling out the National Guard, imposing a curfew, or banning all public meetings.
Directly defining the threshold of violence is the more difficult
approach, but a permit denial or injunction based on such an effort
should be upheld as long as certain definitional strictures are observed. First, the violence must be serious enough to cause either
personal injuries requiring hospitalization or substantial property
damage in dollar terms-not simply a few broken windows. The
violence also must be in the same general area as that requested for
the proposed demonstration, because a change of setting frequently
breaks the pattern of violence by altering such variables as symbolic
targets, potential victims, hecklers, and hideouts. Furthermore, the
violence must be continual enough to constitute a pattern or background; while one unfortunate occurrence should not be enough, two
successive days of violence can be said to establish such a pattern.
Finally, the violence must be recent. To borrow the language, although not the holding, of Meadowmoor, there must be a "momen-
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tum of fear,'' 155 a "continuing intimidation."156 Generally, this will
mean that the violence must have occurred within the preceding
week. The city should not, however, be required to show that the
particular applicants were associated with the previous violence:
when conditions are severe enough to meet the foregoing criteria,
municipal officials should have the power to prevent all mass
gatherings.
Another way to gauge the background of violence is to look to the
other means the government is willing to employ in order to counter
the threat of more violence. Probably the most drastic means is the
imposition of a general curfew. If a city is willing to subject its lawabiding citizens to the tremendous inconvenience and expense caused
by a general curfew,m then the claim that there is a significant
background of violence gains a good deal of credibility. Indeed, such
a claim is so credible that a per se rule is justified: it should be constitutionally permissible to prohibit any demonstration in an area
where, and at an hour when, a general curfew is in force. Such prohibitions could be challenged only by directly attacking the constitutional validity of the curfew itself,158 or by showing that the curfew
was being enforced so haphazardly that it was no longer a meaningful
credibility check. One difficulty with a per se rule would be that at
the time of the prior-restraint decision it would not be known
whether the curfew would still be in effect on the date proposed for
the demonstration, but that problem can be solved by issuing conditional permits and injunctions.159
Another measure sometimes taken by cities to counter a threat
of impending violence is a ban on all public meetings, or, more
drastically, on all congregations of more than a given number of
people.160 The imposition of such a mini-curfew would mean that the
regularly scheduled P.T.A. meeting or Lions Club picnic could not
be held, and to that extent it would be somewhat of a credibility
check on the city government. But these inconveniences are comparatively minor, especially since there may be no scheduled meetings for the typically short duration of the curfew and since any
events that might be planned could usually be rescheduled. Thus, a
155. 312 U.S. at 294.
156, 312 U.S. at 298.
157. See Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560, 1564-65 (1968).
158. See id. at 1570-73.
159. The standard parade permit might contain the proviso that it is void when
a general curfew is in effect.
160. Several cities have employed such measures. See Note, supra note 157, at 1561

n.6.
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city's willingness to prohibit all public meetings or sizable gatherings cannot be regarded as an adequate index of the gravity of the
situation; nothing short of a general curfew should, by itself, justify
a permit denial for, or an injunction against, the staging of a proposed demonstration.
A third extraordinary means of violence prevention is the calling
out of the National Guard. As is the case with the imposition of a
general curfew, such action is costly and highly disruptive of the lives
of average citizens; governments are not likely to take this course of
action unless the need is real. On the other hand, a Guard call-out
is not so safe a credibility check as a general curfew since the Guard
deployment is not subject to any kind of meaningful direct challenge
in the courts and does not necessarily inconvenience a broad segment
of the population. In recent years there have been a number of
instances-in Wilmington, New Haven, and Washington, D.C., to
name a few-in which the National Guard was called out when
there was no immediate background of actual violence, but rather
only an apprehension thereof. Moreover, it might conceivably be
argued that the presence of the National Guard ought to be a factor
in favor of allowing the demonstration, since then any incipient
violence that might arise could be more easily contained. In light of
these conflicting considerations, the case for giving special significance
to a Guard call-out---either in the form of a per se rule or a presumption-is not persuasive.
Thus, the first amendment should be interpreted to allow municipalities to refuse to issue permits or to obtain injunctions against
demonstrations whenever a serious immediate background of violence
can be established. This background should be provable by the city
in either one of two ways: (I) direct evidence of the violence in terms
of intensity, dispersion, geographic and temporal proximity, and
continuity; or (2) indirect evidence of the seriousness of the situation
as shown by the city's willingness to impose a general curfew on its
citizens. Declarations of martial law and decisions to deploy the
National Guard should not alter the calculus.
G. Failure To Make a Timely Application for a Permit

Most parade permit ordinances require applicants to submit their
requests a certain period of time in advance of the scheduled event.101
161. Of twenty-two municipalities responding to an inquiry on this point, thirteen
have advance-filing requirements: Albany (6 hours), Atlanta (5 days), Berkeley (20
days for parades, 48 hours for meetings), Cleveland (5 days), Kansas City, Mo. (48
hours), Los Angeles (40 days), Louisville (5 days), Memphis (3 days), New York
(36 hours), Portland (60 days), San Antonio (15 days), San Francisco (24 hours),
Seattle (48 hours). Personal correspondence on file with the author.
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This lead time can be important for a number of reasons. It can
enable city officials to evaluate the competing public uses, to put the
police department on notice concerning how many men will have to
be on duty, and to prepare a temperate response to the protestors'
demands and tactics. Advance notice can also be helpful to the news
media in assigning reporters and transporting equipment. In addition, public inconvenience can be minimized if uninterested citizens
can be warned in advance to take a different route or to shop on
another day.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue whether these
advance-filing requirements are consistent with the first amendment.
Recently, a federal district judge in Mississippi struck down a onehour advance-notice requirement and that decision was affirmed per
curiam by the Fifth Circuit.162 However, the opinion of the district
judge appears to have been strongly influenced by the unique context
of the case: "there was nothing about this particular demonstration
that required extra police vigilance" ;163 and "it would seem that the
city officials, in enacting, enforcing, and prosecuting under this ordinance, were motivated primarily by a desire to impede and, if
possible, totally halt all organized civil rights marches within the
corporate limits."164 A thirty-to-sixty-day advance-filing requirement
has also been struck down,165 but time periods of twenty-four166 and
forty-eight167 hours have been upheld, the latter by the Second Circuit "as applied to a demonstration, such as this one, that had been
planned well in advance ...." 168
As a basic constitutional proposition, forty-eight hours should be
the maximum limit for per se advance-filing requirements. A longer
lead time is of course desirable from the viewpoint of both the
162. Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Miss. 1968), afjd. per curiam,
415 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1969). See Note, The Constitutionality of a Requirement To
Give Notice Before Marching, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 270 (1969).
163. 292 F. Supp. at 933.
164. 292 F. Supp. at 934.
165. York v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 665, 152 S.E.2d 259 (1967). The court
suggested that a lead-time requirement of twenty-four hours or less would be upheld.
166. Commonwealth v. Hessler, 141 Pa. Super. 421, 15 A.2d 486 (1940).
167. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
168. 407 F.2d at 84. See also Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d
Cir. 1968) ("[s]uch notice requirements must be examined with special care in view
of the tendency to abuse'); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 972-74 (N.D. Miss.
1969). In A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1969), referring
to the special need to "assure the safety of the President," the court allowed enforcement
of a National Park Service fifteen-day advance-filing requirement for demonstrations
near the White House. Recently, President Nixon graciously waived the requirement
to allow Jane Fonda, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and a hundred thousand other demonstrators
to express their dismay over the United States' intervention in Cambodia. N.Y. Times,
May 10, 1970, § I, at I, col. 8; id., § 1, at 24, col. 6.
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demonstrators and the municipality, especially if the dispute will be
brought to the courts. But with regard to a blanket refusal by the
city even to consider an application for a permit, the overriding
administrative considerations begin to fade out rapidly beyond the
forty-eight-hour mark. Policemen and newsmen are frequently deployed on shorter notice, and the mammoth demonstrations which
require extraordinary policing generally take more than forty-eight
hours to organize; the data on competing uses can be researched in
a day or two; the most effective warning to disinterested citizens will
likely be at the same time and place twenty-four hours before the
demonstration ("tomorrow at this time this street will be closed").
By the same token, while many municipalities seem to favor shorter
advance-notice provisions,169 or none at all,17° a city's claim that it
needs or greatly benefits from more than one day's notice before a
demonstration is certainly credible, and should ordinarily satisfy the
demands of the first amendment.
Special problems are posed by demonstrations which are either
spontaneous or organized on short notice in response either to local
grievances-such as the arrest of a protest leader-or to monumental
national events-such as the assassination of Martin Luther King or
the intervention in Cambodia. These spontaneous gatherings are in
many ways the most genuine form of expression-a refreshing change
from the carefully orchestrated "pseudo-events"171 that play such a
dominant role in the contemporary political scenario. Moreover, because emotions run high on these spontaneous occasions, it is especially important that the permit process, with whatever semblance
of notice and cooperation it can contribute, be workable. City officials
will often waive the lead-time requirement out of empathy or fear,172
and a few ordinances provide explicitly for an exception to the
advance-filing requirement for "good cause"173 or "in the discretion
of the Chief of Police for any unexpected occasion."174 Nevertheless,
some municipalities retain such a boundless capacity for insensitivity175 that a permit denial under such circumstances may sometimes
169. E.g., Albany, New York City, San Francisco. See note 161 supra.
170. E.g., Birmingham, Boston, Boulder, Colo., Champaign, Ill., Dallas, Denver,
Ithaca, N.Y., Madison, Oakland. Nine of twenty-two responding to the inquiry.
See note 161 supra.
171. See D. BooRSTIN, THE !MAGE (2d ed. 1964).
172. Such subjective pressures operate not only on city bureaucrats, but on the
judiciary as well. See text following note 272 infra.
173. San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 36221, § 4(3), Feb. 15, 1968.
174. SEATTLE, WASH., Crrr CODE § 21.60.080 (1967). See also Los ANGELES, CALIF,,
MUNICIPAL CODE § 103.111(0) (1969).
175. The Austin, Texas, City Council recently invoked its fifteen-day advance-filing
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demand judicial attention. With a forty-eight-hour advance-notice
provision, further constitutional intervention should be confined to
exceptional cases in which unforeseen events of obvious importance
make immediate protest efficacious. In those few instances, however,
the considerations of municipal efficiency and public convenience
that justify an advance-filing requirement under normal conditions
must give way before the weighty first amendment interest in spontaneous expression.
H. Refusal or Inability To Pay the Costs Associated

with the Demonstration
Policing demonstrations costs money, as does administering a
permit system. Who should pay? The statute upheld by the Supreme
Court in Cox v. New Hampshire 116 required marchers to pay the
costs-up to 300 dollars-of policing the event.177 In movie censorship cases, lower courts have upheld both flat permit fees and fees
based on film footage. 178 The Supreme Court cases striking down
"speech taxes"179 have all carefully distinguished assessments reasonably related to administrative costs. Thus, the principle of pay-asyou-go, even for "free" speech, appears to be well established.
There is more behind the principle than sterile precedent. User
taxes are often hailed as the fairest of all.180 Moreover, if the city is
forced to defray administrative costs, it is likely to be more resistant
to permit requests-at a cost to both sides in that energies which
could be devoted to cooperation and planning are wasted in litigation. Large and frequent demonstrations can severely strain a police
department, making patrolmen assigned to such events resentful and
vindictive, and diminishing the level of protection afforded in other
requirement to deny a permit to a crowd of twenty thousand citizens seeking to
march in protest against the Cambodian intervention. The local federal district judge
ordered that the permit be issued. Ad Hoc Strike Comm. of the Univ. of Texas v.
Miles, No. A-70-CA-33 (W.D. Tex., May 8, 1970). See also Houston Peace Coalition v.
Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
176. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
177. 312 U.S. at 572.
178. Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966); Universal
Film Exchanges, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1968). In
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56-57 n.3 (1965), the petitioners claimed that the
permit fee was an impermissible "speech tax," but the Court did not reach the issue.
179. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Jones v. Opelika, 319
U.S. 103 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See also NAACP v. City of Chester, 253 F. Supp. 707
(E.D. Pa. 1966), in which the court struck down a $25 fee for operating a sound
truck absent any showing by the city that the fee was reasonably related to the cost
of enforcing the soundtruck ordinance.
180. See R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF Ptmuc FINANCE ch. 4 (1959), and references
cited therein.
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neighborhoods. At some point, repeated demonstrations can amount
to an act of political ransom, with the protestors holding the city's
police resources hostage until their demands are met. Even if the problem of economic coercion is disregarded, it can be argued that the
resource allocation decision should balance not only immediately
competing uses but also total use over time, and that any rationing
system other than the market would be hopelessly complicated and
inefficient. Charging for police protection can also be defended as
a check against frivolous demonstrations and as a fair assessment for
the valuable media time that is often a consequence and, indeed, a
purpose of mass gatherings. The contention that such an assessment
for exercising the privilege of free speech discriminates against the
poor can be countered by a special provision in the scheme for indigents and by the observation that the rich are also deterred from
demonstrating by the economists' concept of opportunity cost.181
There are precedents, however, that point in the opposite direction. The cases securing lawyers and transcripts for indigent defendants,182 at the very least, undermine the absolute integrity of the
pay-as-you-go principle, even though they are distinguishable on a
number of grounds: nonindigents still have to pay, the want is more
important (or at least more strongly felt), and the need for legal
services arises only because of governmental initiative. Moreover,
read broadly, the indigent-defendant cases may stand for the proposition that the level of assertion of constitutional rights should not be
affected by personal budgetary considerations-that nonindigents
are not entitled to free counsel only because they appreciate the value
of the right involved and are willing to pay for it-a happy circumstance not present for other more amorphous rights such as voting
and speech. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the
majority opinion in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 183 in
which the Court struck down the Virginia poll tax in state elections,
appears to proceed on the assumption that even an exemption for
indigents would not make the poll tax constitutional; even the rich
cannot be made to pay a dollar and a half to vote.
The right to assemble, like the right to vote, is the kind of right
about which constitutional theorists wax eloquent184 but for which
181. For example, a partner of Sullivan &: Cromwell must forgo hundreds of dollars
in billable time in order to attend a "support our boys" rally.
182. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
183. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
184. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 7, at 32,
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many people are unwilling to pay; these rights require special judicial
attention not because they are so fundamental, but because they are
so unappreciated. Unlike voting, however, it cannot be said that
society has a positive stake in the maximum assertion of the right to
demonstrate. Rather, the right of assembly is somewhat like a demand
deposit; it can exist only because not everyone will claim it at the
same time. When the additional element of violence potential is
considered, the conclusion seems warranted that assembly is indeed
a right that must be rationed. While other rationing systems can be
imagined-for example, a limit on the number of major demonstrations in which a person could participate during a given time period,
with the city having the burden of enjoining specific individuals
from further participation after proving that they had exhausted
their quotas-a system based on willingness to pay, with an indigency
provision, would seem to be not merely permissible, but optimal.
Unfortunately, the fairness of a payment system in principle does
not necessarily mean that such a system will be fair in practice. A
burdensome system of administration could undercut the theoretical
protection for indigents, could filter out not only frivolous demonstrators but also those who happen to be financially cautious or busy,
and could provide hostile city officials with an ideal low-visibility
censorship technique in the form of inflated estimates of required
police resources. Even a payment system administered in complete
good faith would force demonstrators to pay in part both for the
paranoia of police officials and for the antics of hecklers, since both
would increase the number of officers necessarily assigned to an event.
These dangers attendant to a pay-as-you-go system are real. They
cannot be adequately guarded against by a case-by-case judicial
review of rejected indigency claims and police-assignment decisions.
The burden of delay and doubt must be placed on the city. One
permissible scheme would be to require the city to issue a police-cost
estimate with every permit granted, then to require the demonstrators
to make a good faith effort to collect the necessary amount by whatever means they choose-passing the hat, charging admission,
soliciting advance donations-and finally to hold the sponsors of the
demonstration criminally liable upon proof by the city that a goodfaith collection effort was not made. Admittedly, the good faith
requirement would be difficult to enforce; the sponsors' exhortation
to "give generously" might have a disingenuous ring when the crowd
knows that the police are to be the ultimate recipients of its largess.
Municipalities may be able to devise more effective cost-assessment schemes that are no more inhibiting to demonstrators and are
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no more subject to abuse than the one outlined above. But any
alternative that is more burdensome to the assertion of the right of
assembly should be struck down. In particular, requirements of
advance payment or suretyship should not pass first amendment
scrutiny. Whatever these advance-payment schemes may gain for the
city in financial security must necessarily be outweighed by the
abundant opportunities they offer for abuse by unsympathetic city
officials. The outcome of this balance cannot be in doubt when it is
remembered that the assessment is justified in the first place not as a
matter of municipal fiscal integrity, but to prevent economic coercion
and the promiscuous assertion of rights.
Although the common practice among municipalities is to accept
applications and issue permits free of charge, a few municipalities
charge a small fee to defray the costs of administering the permit
system itself.185 A constitutional challenge to the assessment of these
fees could be mounted, based on Harper. 186 The issue presented by
these administration fees is different from the police-cost issue in
that payment of the administration fees is sought in advance, and
the political-ransom and police-resentment rationales are inapplicable. The assessment of such fees can, however, be defended as a
minimal commitment check-especially in a city that does not
charge for police-and as a rationing device that is proper for mass
demonstrations but not for voting, thereby distinguishing Harper.
Furthermore, the primary objection to an advance-payment requirement-the danger of abuse-is not present when the fee is uniform.
Thus, a uniform fee based on the costs of administering the permit
system-not including the city's litigation expenses-and including
an indigency provision, should be upheld.
Some cities require permit applicants to have liability insurance
for property damage or personal injuries that might occur as a result
of the demonstration. Tort law on the problem of liability in the
demonstration setting is unsettled,187 and the first amendment would
seem to impose limits of its mm on the standard of liability,188 just as
it has for the torts of invasion of privacy189 and defamation. 190 With185. Of twenty-five cities responding to an inquiry on this point, four charge
some fees: Cleveland ($1), Denver ($4), Los Angeles ($10), Oakland ($5).
Personal correspondence on file with the author.
186. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
187. See Maxwell v. SCLC, 414 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1969); REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 302A, 302B, 303 (1965).
188. See Comment, Negligence and the First Amendment: A Note on the Destructive
Assembly, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 391 (1970).
189. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
190. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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out venturing into a prescriptive essay on this tangential subject, it is
sufficient to note that innocent third parties often suffer financial
and physical injury as a result of demonstrations, that the individual
tortfeasors frequently cannot be identified or are judgment-proof,
and that the municipality is seldom either liable or charitable.191 If
the organizers of the demonstration may be held liable,192 why
shouldn't precautions be taken to make sure that they are not
judgment-proof?
There are several difficulties with an insurance requirement.
First, if the sponsors are so indigent that they are judgment-proof,
they may be unable to afford the liability insurance premiums. Also,
this type of insurance may be very difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain; would even Lloyd's insure the Weathermen? Even if insurance companies were forced to write demonstration liability policies
under an assigned-risk statute, the rates would undoubtedly be astronomical,193 and the city could discriminate against unpopular groups
by varying the size of the policy demanded.194 Moreover, peaceful
groups would be forced to pay costly premiums not only because of
the excesses of their own fringe members, but also indirectly because
of the destructive forays of other groups with diametrically opposed
views-a phenomenon that might even give these opposing groups
an incentive to engage in violence.
Furthermore, viable alternatives to required liability insurance
exist. If the danger of violence is great, nonparticipants can board
up their shops and absent themselves from the area of the demonstration. Victims of protest demonstrations often have, or are able to
obtain, extended-coverage insurance protection195 at rates much
lower than those charged to the victims of ghetto riots since the risk
is not so geographically concentrated. In this regard, the Federal
191. See Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage, 81 HARv. L. REv. 653 (1968);
Comment, Municipal Liability for a Policy of Permitting Riot Damage, 47 TEXAS L.
REv. 633 (1969).
192. Organizers might be held liable, in spite of their first amendment privileges, if
their reckless disregard of necessary safety precautions can be proved. Cf. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
193. Conceivably the rates could be regulated, but if free assembly is to be
subsidized it is difficult to see why private insurance companies rather than the government should bear the burden.
194. Protest groups at the 1968 Democratic National Convention were confronted
with a $100,000-to-$300,000 insurance policy requirement, instituted for the occasion
by Chicago city officials, as a condition for the issuance of a permit for a rally at Grant
Park. D. WALKER, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 68 (1968).
195. See Note, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE L.J. 541, 543-45 (1968); Note, Compensation
for Yictims of Urban Riots, 68 CoLUM. L REv. 57, 59-65 (1968).
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Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968196 may be
of some assistance. Moreover, a number of state statutes hold municipalities strictly liable for riot damage.197 This approach has proved
too expensive in cities which have suffered major ghetto uprisings,198
but it would seem to be financially feasible if limited to planned
demonstrations. On the other hand, each of these approaches has
drawbacks. Strict municipal liability, for example, might cause extra
resistance by city officials to the granting of permit requests and, at
the same time, extra violence by protestors whose anger or economic
coercion is directed at the city administration. The point is simply
that from among the several possibilities available to a city for allocating the cost of violence, any one that would force demonstrators as
a class to bear the cost should be disallowed. This is so not because
singling out a class of those who exercise their constitutional rights
is improper per se-although it should be highly suspect-but because such a singling out can be enforced only by prepayment in
the form of insurance premiums, and a prepayment requirement is
certain significantly to discourage demonstrations and disproportionately to burden poor protesters.
This reasoning applies also to behavior and peace bonds. 199 While
these surety devices traditionally have been required only from individuals, they may be more effective in the group context, since fear
of forfeiting the bond may make moderates unusually energetic
and persuasive in their efforts to control their more aggressive compatriots. The more likely result, however, is that extremist groups
may intentionally cause forfeitures in order to abort promising
moderate movements. Even if it were stipulated that the antics of
hecklers and lunatic-fringe elements would not result in forfeiture
of the bond, the precise cause of violent outbursts is usually difficult
to identify. It might also be argued that peace bonds would provide
a great incentive for police riots. When these considerations are
added to the usual drawbacks of prepayment-possible abuse in
setting the amount, the special burden on poor groups, intense personal pressure on the wealthier members of a group once more to
supply financial backing-the conclusion is compelling that any
attempt to extend peace- and behavior-bond requirements into the
realm of demonstration regulation should be struck down.
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See Comment, Municipal Liability
for a Policy of Permitting Riot Damage, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 633, 639 (1969).
197. See Comment, supra note 196, at 635•36.
198. Id. at 638.
199. See generally Note, Peace and Behavior Bonds-Summary Punishment for
Uncommitted Offenses, 52 VA. L. REv. 914 (1966).
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I. Summary
As a matter of constitutional law, municipalities should be able
to prohibit demonstrations, either by permit denials or injunctions,
only upon showing one of the following: (I) that more persons would
be seriously inconvenienced by the event than would participate in
it; (2) that the number of persons who would be less than seriously
inconvenienced would be grossly disproportionate to the number of
participants; (3) that the site, time, size, or duration of the proposed
demonstration is prohibited by a uniformly enforced per se rule that
is not unconstitutional in that a very high percentage of the demonstrations covered by the rule would be prohibited under the controlled-balancing standard; (4) that the applicants, after receiving a
permit, have refused to inform the city of the general message or
purpose of the proposed demonstration; (5) that a significant number
of the demonstrators have a specific intent, manifested by specific
plans, to engage in or provoke violence; (6) that a background of
serious, recent, continuous, and widespread violence exists in the
general location proposed for the demonstration; (7) that a fully
enforced general curfew will be in existence at the time and place
proposed for the demonstration; (8) that the applicants have failed
to make a timely application for a permit, and could have done so
since their demonstration was not in immediate response to an event
of obvious importance; (9) that the applicants refuse to pay a small,
uniform filing fee.
Municipalities should not be held to a strict equal protection
standard in allowing demonstrations; if city officials wish to give
popular groups extraordinary demonstration privileges, similar treatment for unpopular groups should not be a constitutional requirement, except in the case of a waiver of per se restrictions on size,
time, place, and duration. The first amendment should be interpreted to prohibit the denial of a permit or the granting of an
injunction simply because an alternative time or site for the demonstration would be preferable. As a matter of constitutional requisite,
however, permit denials and injunctions should contain counteroffers of alternative acceptable times and sites.
Permit applicants should not be required to state the message
or purpose of their demonstration in advance of the granting of the
permit, but should be required to do so aftenvard. A permit never
should be denied nor an injunction granted because violence is
anticipated from hostile bystanders. The past conduct of the demonstrators never should be considered in ruling upon permit applications or injunction requests. In addition, formal statements of
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emergency, declarations of martial law, less-than-general curfews, and
deployments of the National Guard should not affect the constitutional calculus. With the exception of small, uniform filing fees, the
right to demonstrate should never be conditioned on any sort of
advance payment, either in the form of peace or behavior bonds,
insurance requirements, or assessments for police and clean-up expenses. A requirement of subsequent payment for police and clean-up
services should be permissible; however, demonstration organizers,
rather than being held personally liable for the amount, should be
held only criminally liable for failing to exert a good faith effort to
raise the amount from the participants.
Each of the foregoing "shoulds" should be read into the first
amendment and enforced as a constitutional principle.

III.

THE PROCEDURAL STANDARDS

"[I]t is just as [the substantive] issues grow more difficult and
divisive," Professor Paul Freund has observed, "that the procedural
injustices about which there can be readier consensus tend to become
grounds of decision."200 This phenomenon is already at work in the
free speech area; one commentator has even proclaimed the existence
of a distinct "first amendment due process."201
Although the courts have largely ignored the procedural issues
raised by prior restraints on demonstrations, the few judicial stirrings
have all been promising. The majority opinion in Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham202 pointedly and gratuitously observed that the
constitutionality of a permit scheme depends upon "among other
things the availability of expeditious judicial review of the Commission's refusal of a permit."203 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
also included a lengthy discussion of the need for expeditious processing of applications. 204 Both opinions stressed the relevance of
Freedman v. Maryland,2° 5 the case which initiated the constitutional
requirement of expeditious review procedures for film censorship
rulings. Also, a number of lower courts have applied the Freedman
principles in the demonstrations context.206 If Freedman is consis200. P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 96-97 (1968).
201. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 518, 518-20
(1970).
202. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
203. 394 U.S. at 155 n.4.
204. 394 U.S. at 161-64.
205. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
206. See, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Snyder
v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of m., 286 F. Supp. 927, 936 (N.D. m. 1968);
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tently so applied, and if its principles are read broadly, the forces of
bureaucratic inefficiency and inertia will be realigned on the side of
the protestors. That development would make the substantive reforms discussed in the preceding section seem like mere frosting on
the cake.

A. Freedman v. Maryland
Although the substantive standards in Maryland's movie censorship scheme were very likely unconstitutional ("tend ... to debase
or corrupt morals or incite to crimes"207), Freedman's challenge
to the Maryland law focused on the procedures of the prior restraint.
Under those procedures, the exhibitor was required to submit all
films before exhibition to the board of censors; no time limit for
board action was set out; a film could be suppressed pendente lite
for an indefinite period before any court had ruled upon it; judicial
proceedings to review the censorship board's rulings had to be initiated by the exhibitor; and there was no fixed time limit for judicial
disposition. Thus, in effect, a case could continue for months, with
the film remaining under ·wraps all the while.
The petitioner's decision to attack on the procedural flank turned
out to be brilliant. The Supreme Court tossed one sop to the censors
-the requirement that the exhibitor had the initial obligation to
submit all films for inspection was held to entail no constitutional
invalidity208-and then invalidated all other major features of the
Maryland scheme.209 The Court then went on to prescribe the equivalent of a code of censorship procedure: (1) "the burden of proving
that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor"; 210
(2) "the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial
construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period,
either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film"; 211
(3) "[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the
Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. i965). In addition, the
commentators seem to be in agreement that the Freedman principles should apply to
demonstration regulation. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV.
L. REv. 518 (1970); Note, Parade Ordinances and Prior Restraints, 30 Omo ST. L.J.
856 (1969); Note, Parades and Protest Demonstrations: Punctual Judicial Review of
Prior Restraints on First Amendment Liberties, 45 IND. L.J. 114 (1969); The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 145-46 (1967).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Mo. ANN. CooE art. 66A, § 6 (1957), quoted at 380 U.S. at 52 n.2.
380 U.S. at 53-54.
!l80 U.S. at 58-60.
380 U.S. at 58.
380 U.S. at 58-59.
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status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution"; 212 (4) "the procedure must also assure a prompt final
judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and
possibly erroneous denial of a license."213
The Maryland scheme was so far short of the mark that the actual
application of the new constitutional principles in the case at hand
added nothing in the way of refinement. Subsequent Supreme Court
and lower court cases have, however, clarified the picture somewhat.
The "specified brief period" for administrative action has been given
a quantitative gloss: fifty-seven days is too long214 but twelve days plus
an at-the-earliest-practicable-time step is permissible.215 Pendente
lite restraints prior to the first judicial determination were approved
in both Interstate Circuit Incorporated v. City of Dallas216 and
Universal Film Exchanges Incorporated v. City of Chicago; 217 in the
former case the restraint could have lasted as long as nineteen
days,218 in the latter, twenty-three days.219 In Interstate Circuit the
"prompt final judicial decision" was interpreted to refer only to the
trial court's ruling; 220 apparently there is no constitutional requirement that appellate review be expedited. In Teitel Film Corporation v. Cusack,221 however, the Court held that it is not enough
for a scheme to provide for a prompt trial court hearing; provision
must also be made for a judicial decision within a specified brief
period of time. 222 In Interstate Circuit the Court held that the requirement of a judicial decision within nine days after the administrative classification passed constitutional muster on that point.223
B. The Freedman Principles Applied to Demonstrations

The majority in Freedman added a word of caution for those who
would apply its principles on prior-restraint procedure in other contexts: "The requirement of prior submission to a censor sustained
in Times Film is consistent with our recognition that films differ
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

380 U.S. at 59.
380 U.S. at 59.
Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
390 U.S. 676 (1968).
288 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
390 U.S. at 679.
288 F. Supp. at 289.
390 U.S. at 690 n.22.
390 U.S. 139 (1968).
390 U.S. at 142.
390 U.S. at 690 n.22.
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from other forms of expression. Similarly, we think that the nature
of the motion picture industry may suggest different time limits for
a judicial determination." 224 On the other hand, Justice Harlan
suggested in his Shuttlesworth concurrence that the Freedman principles should apply a fortiori in the demonstrations context:
The right to assemble peaceably to voice political protest is at least
as basic as the right to exhibit a motion picture which may have some
aesthetic value. Moreover, slow-moving procedures have a much more
severe impact in the instant case than they had in Freedman. Though
a movie exhibitor might suffer some financial loss if he were obliged
to wait for a year or two while the administrative and judicial mills
ground out a result, it is nevertheless quite likely that the public
would ultimately see the film. In contrast, timing is of the essence in
politics. It is almost impossible to predict the political future; and
when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard
promptly, if it is to be considered at all.225
When a radical idea enlists the support of Justice Harlan, one is
tempted to assume that surely its time has come. Nevertheless, a
principle by which the Constitution begins to set docket priorities
is not to be accepted lightly. A more detailed comparison of film
censorship and demonstration regulation must precede any extension
of the Freedman principles into the demonstration regulation area,
especially since that comparison may vary depending on which aspect
of the Freedman procedural code is at issue.
1. The Burden of Proof

Freedman placed "the burden of proving"226-presumably encompassing both the burden of going forward with evidence and the
burden of persuasion-on the government because "the transcendant
value of speech is involved"227 and also because "[p]articularly in the
case of motion pictures, it may take very little to deter exhibition in
a given locality."228 In assigning the burden of proof, the Court was
especially worried about the danger of self-censorship: "The exhibitor's stake in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a
protracted and onerous course of litigation. The distributor, on the
other hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the burdens and
delays of litigation in a particular area when, without such difficulties,
he can freely exhibit his film in most of the rest of the country ...." 2 20
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

380 U.S. at 60-61.
394 U.S. at 162-63.
380 U.S. at 58.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), quoted at 380 U.S. at 58.
380 U.S. at 59.
380 U.S. at 59.
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Neither the "transcendant value" nor the self-censorship rationale would seem to apply with much force in the context of demonstration regulation. The former appears to be an application of the
familiar policy of 11:andicapping disfavored contentions in assigning
the burden of proo£: 2ao Not all speech regulation contentions should
be formally disfavored, however. It is one thing to say that the regulatory interest in film censorship should be handicapped because it
is dubious, amorphous, and quite possibly irrational, or to say that
the regulatory interest in denying tax exemptions to alleged subversives should be burdened for similar reasons.231 It is quite a different
matter to burden the regulatory interest when it is concrete and
undeniable, as in the case of demonstrations, and when prevailing
substantive doctrine-the controlled balance-has already attempted
to reflect the transcendant value of speech.
The self-censorship rationale would also seem to be inapplicable
in the demonstration regulation context. There is little reason to
believe that "it may take very little to deter [demonstrations] in a
given locality."232 Demonstrators probably do not, as a rule, compute
marginal cost before pursuing their legal remedies. Perhaps some
groups are deterred by an unwillingness or inability to pay for legal
representation, by general paranoia about the court system, or by
inertia; but constraints of that sort are not affected by shifting the
burden of proof.
In the absence of any doctrinal help from the Freedman opinion,
the problem of assigning the burden of going forward and the burden
of persuasion can be solved by resort to two traditional principles:
(I) both burdens should be placed on the party who has superior
access to the relevant evidence; 233 (2) a party should not be required
to prove a negative. 234 Under the substantive standards detailed
above,235 four issues of fact are likely to recur in disputes over
demonstration regulation: (1) the number of people who will be
seriously inconvenienced; (2) the number of people expected to participate in the demonstration; (3) whether a significant number of
those expected to participate have a specific intent to engage in, or
to provoke, violence; (4) whether a sufficient background of violence
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

C. McCO1tMICK, EVIDENCE § 318, at 674 (1954).
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318, at 675 (1954).
Id.
See pts. II. A.-F. supra.
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exists to justify prohibiting all demonstrations for the time being.
On the first and fourth issues, the city should have the burden of
proof because of its superior access to the relevant evidence. For the
same reason, the demonstrators should have the burden on the
second issue. On the other hand, the city should have the burden on
the third issue-specific intent-because othenvise the demonstrators
would be required to prove a negative, always a difficult task, but
one bordering on the impossible in the realm of intent. While these
assignments of the burden of proof follow traditional common-law
principles, they should be considered constitutional requirements:
the fact that the first amendment may not require more than the
common law does should not mean that it cannot forbid eccentric
state schemes that attempt to provide less.

2. The Deadline for Administrative Action

The censorship scheme in Maryland which led to the development of the Freedman principles provided for an administrative
evaluation of all films by a board of censors. Similar provisions for
administrative determination of demonstration permit requests are
also possible, although, as will be discussed below,236 they may not be
constitutionally required. Whether the administrative decision is
made pursuant to formal or informal procedures, it is necessary to
determine whether the Freedman requirement of the "specified brief
period" for administrative action231 should apply to the regulation
of demonstrations.
In deciding this question, it is first necessary to ask whether the
principle of a definite time deadline would be desirable in the demonstration permit context and then whether the maximum permissible
time lag between the filing of the permit application and final
administrative action should be the same for demonstrations as it is
for films.
In some respects, a definite deadline for administrative action
would seem to be even more important for demonstration regulation
than for film censorship. In his Shuttlesworth concurrence, Justice
Harlan rejected the notion that the Freedman administrative deadline can be traced in any sense to the unique importance of the
motion picture as a mode of expression; he found the demonstration
"at least as basic" in terms of first amendment values. 238 Justice
Harlan also pointed out that timing tends to be more important for
236, See text accompanying notes 273-82 infra.
237, 380 U.S. at 59,
238. 394 U.S. at 162,

1540

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:1481

political speech than for artistic expression, since political ideas are
more often of a topical nature. 239 While the demonstration is becoming an art form in its own right, and while political films are not
unknown, it is probably a fair generalization to treat demonstrations
as political, and thus especially dependent upon timing. Even apart
from the factor of topicality, the showing of films can frequently be
delayed indefinitely without in any way affecting their content,
whereas delay can often seriously undermine a demonstration-even
one with an eternal message-since the participatory enthusiasm on
which it is based may wane rapidly or be diverted into other channels.
Timing is relevant in still another respect in that both films and
demonstrations are dependent to some extent on promotional activities. Unlike the amateur advertising usually associated with demonstrations, however, film promotion is more often institutionalized
and durable-the coming attractions, the radio spots, and the posters
can all be saved and used at a later date. Also, films are such that they
need not always be advertised contemporaneously with their exhibition: since the advertising relates to a product that will be available
to the consumer over a period of time, the effect may linger in the
consumer's subconscious for months. Demonstration advertising, on
the other hand, must of necessity be informational rather than subliminal, and is, accordingly, much more dependent on close temporal
proximity to the event. All of these considerations add up to a more
elaborate explication of Justice Harlan's basic proposition that insofar as the importance of timing for the particular speech activity is
determinative, the Freedman requirement of an administrative deadline should apply a fortiori in the context of mass demonstrations. 240
Another factor mentioned in Freedman was the probability of
passive acceptance of incorrect censorship rulings-a problem particularly acute in the motion picture context in light of the almost
exclusively financial motivations of exhibitors and distributors,241
and the absence of any power in the hands of the viewing public to
initiate litigation on the subject. Certainly there is less danger of this
type of calculated cop-out in disputes over demonstration permits,
since protestors are likely to be more ideological than movie exhibitors and, for that matter, more stubborn. On the other hand, the fact
that most demonstrations are so dependent on timing often produces
the same result as passive acceptance, since an administrative "pocket
239. 394 U.S. at 162-63.
240. Justice Harlan stated, "The Freedman principle is applicable here." 394 U.S.
at 162.
241. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
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veto" or an eleventh-hour rejection which leaves no time for judicial
review can likewise result in the effective disallowance of speech that
should be protected under the prevailing substantive standards. Also,
considering the institutional legal resources of the film industry and
the promotional advantages that protracted, controversial litigation
can sometimes entail, it is by no means clear that the forces of regulatory inefficiency and inertia have the potential to cause more of a
chilling effect on films than on demonstrations. Thus, insofar as
Freedman's administrative deadline can be traced to a concern over
this chilling effect phenomenon, it would seem to apply also in the
context of demonstration regulation.
An additional dimension to the administrative deadline issue, not
mentioned either in Freedman or in Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Shuttlesworth, is the social cost of an incorrect rejection of a
permit request. In the case of motion pictures, the cost can be calculated entirely in terms of the speech value lost thereby. Except
perhaps in the case of "underground" exhibitors, defiance of censorship rulings is most improbable,242 and even when such defiance
occurs it is no more disruptive or costly than an approved showing.
When a demonstration is incorrectly (in terms of the prevailing substantive standards) prohibited, on the other hand, the cost is likely to
be quite high: loss of the message, further political alienation of the
demonstrators, and, most important, a squandered opportunity for
planning and cooperation in the event that the applicants decide to
demonstrate anyway. Furthermore, outright defiance of prohibitions
on demonstrations is not an uncommon phenomenon; and the outcome can be bloody. When the permit rejection is correct on the
merits, such confrontations can be blamed on the demonstrators, and
can be considered unavoidable if the rule of law is to be maintained.
When the prohibition is incorrect, however, in terms of the prevailing substantive standards, the violence and the destruction-not to
mention the political polarization-must be considered a cost that, in
many instances, could have been avoided by streamlined procedures
-including an administrative deadline. It is this factor of the social
cost of procedural sloth that most clearly distinguishes film censorship from demonstration regulation, and most imperatively requires
the application of the Freedman administrative deadline a fortiori
in the latter context.
In searching for distinctions that might justify a refusal to extend
242. This is true especially in view of the city's plentiful retaliatory resources:
building inspections, tax assessments, zoning restrictions, parking regulations, and the
like,
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the Freedman administrative deadline to demonstrations, an argument can be made emphasizing the relative importance of bargaining
in the two regulatory situations. Films can be spliced, but only at
a sacrifice in artistic integrity; negotiation and bargaining are not
regular features of the film censorship process. On the other hand,
major demonstrations are often preceded by weeks of negotiating and
compromising over routes, schedules, and even the amenities of
arrest. 243 It can be argued that a fixed deadline for administrative
action may operate not unlike compulsory arbitration in that it may
sap the incentive from both sides to seek earnestly a collectivebargaining solution. If city officials are denied the opportunity for
extended negotiations, they may well adopt a policy to reject all
controversial requests, thereby transferring the whole problem to the
courts. Even if the courts should eventually rule for the demonstrators, an atmosphere of hostility may have been created in place of the
cooperation and mutual planning that might have reigned had there
been more time for bargaining.
This line of reasoning should be rejected, however, for two
reasons. First, a deadline for administrative action need not foreclose
negotiations. The parties can still bargain against the deadline for
court action-hardly a strange phenomenon in civil litigation. One
might even surmise that, at present, a major barrier to effective bargaining is the hope on the part of city officials that they may be able
to escape with a pocket veto. Second, and more important, even if
the deadline for administrative action is thought to hinder rather
than help the bargaining process, it is by no means clear that the
right to demonstrate should be defined by tests of will and strength.
To encourage bargaining is to encourage the parties to cultivate
their respective bargaining cards. For permit applicants-at least
those without significant political power-the ace in the hole at the
bargaining table is their relative ability and willingness to cause
violence if the permit is not granted, either directly or by provoking
a police reaction; for the city, on the other hand, the ace in the hole
is the willingness to make life extremely unpleasant for those who
demonstrate without a permit. A process that rewards these types of
skills and attitudes should be viewed with some alarm. Also, bargaining should not be preferred merely on the basis of its greater flexibility,
since imaginative use of equitable remedies such as the injunction
can more than adequately close the flexibility gap.
The conclusion seems inescapable, then, that a definite deadline
243. See, e.g., D. WALKER, RIGHTS IN CoNFLic-r 59-94 (1968); N. MAILER, THE
ARMIES OF THE NIGHT 236-43 (1968).
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for final administrative action should be a constitutional requirement
for prior restraints on demonstrations. The remaining issue is what
exactly should be the maximum permissible time lag between the
application date and final administrative disposition. It may be that
because of the complexity of the evidence relevant to the issue of
competing public uses, the time limit for demonstration regulation
should be longer than that for film censorship. However, the Dallas
film censorship procedure approved in the Interstate Circuit dictum
permitted a maximum time lag of twelve days with an at-the-earliestpracticable-time provision; 244 and there is nothing in the opinion to
indicate that an even longer maximum time lag might not be
approved. One week should be a sufficient period for administrative
action on demonstration permit requests, especially if the administrative decision is entrusted to a regular government department, rather
than, as is generally the case with film censorship, a special panel of
private citizens who can meet only at a mutually convenient time.
The extreme importance of timing245 and the high social cost of delay
in the demonstration context246 are additional considerations which
support the conclusion that any prior-restraint scheme that allows
a maximum time lag of more than one week between the application
date and the final administrative disposition should be found to be
unconstitutional.
Moreover, even a one-week deadline would be inadequate for
what is probably a sizable percentage of the permit applicationsthose filed less than a week before the proposed date for the event.
It can be argued that no special adjustment should be made for these
requests-that the threat of a pocket veto provides applicants with
a healthy incentive to file early. .As mentioned earlier,247 however,
many demonstrations are in direct response to rapidly developing
political events, and it is precisely this species of protest that carries
a high risk of spontaneous combustion if some semblance of cooperation with city officials is not established. A sensible principle to follow
for such cases would be to insist that the applicants have at least one
opportunity for judicial relief and that, accordingly, final administrative disposition must occur no later than ttventy-four hours before
the scheduled event. 248
244-. 390 U.S. at 679.
245. See text accompanying notes 225 &: 239 supra.
246. See text accompanying note 242 supra.
247. See text accompanying note 225 supra.
248. Coupled with the permissible forty-eight-hour advance-filing requirement (see
text accompanying notes 169-70 supra), this would always give the city at least twentyfour hours to make its administrative decision.
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3. The Burden of Initiating Judicial Proceedings

A casual reader of the Freedman opinion might overlook what
is probably the most important of its procedural reforms: the requirement that city officials act not only promptly, but also affirmatively.
Outright denial of a license no longer suffices; the city must "either
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film." 249 Thus,
in effect, Freedman demands that the supposed benefits of censorship
be balanced against not only the speech value of the film, but also
against the value of the city attorney's time and energy-a concrete
consideration that may commend itself to bureaucrats who could
never be made to genuflect before "the market place of ideas." While
this drain on city hall legal resources would have to be considered
even if the burden of initiative were reversed and the city were forced
to contemplate only a defensive posture in litigation if it rejected
the application, affirmatively placing the obligation to sue on the
city may make a difference, for three reasons: (1) the responsibility
to take affirmative action may force city officials to do some hard
thinking about priorities-thinking that would seldom germinate in
normal bureaucratic routine; (2) offensive litigation may be more
burdensome than defensive litigation (it takes more time and
thought to draft a complaint than a general denial); and (3) the city
attorney's office, which is likely to be more informed about-and
probably more sympathetic to-first amendment rights, will make
the final administrative decision rather than the censorship board.2 ~0
Once more, these policies would seem to carry over into the area
of demonstration regulation. A fortiori arguments can again be
made: (1) since there is a potential for violence in demonstrations,
city officials, fearful of being held responsible for their decisions, are
probably even more cautious in granting permits than are film
censorship boards-thus there is a need for a requirement of affirmative action to counterbalance this inclination; (2) demonstrators are
less likely than film exhibitors to have retained counsel who are
familiar with the permit procedures-thus it may not be fair to put
the burden of initiating court action on them. Also, in light of the
fact that the city attorney should be familiar with the permit procedures and should have greater access to evidence than the demonstrators, he should be in a better position to assess whether litigation
is likely to be worth the effort. Thus, the burden of initiating judicial
proceedings in disputes over demonstration permits should be placed
249. 380 U.S. at 59.
250. Or in the case of demonstrations, the decision would be made by the parks
department or the police department.
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on the municipal government. This should be so even when the
application is submitted less than a week in advance, so that the
controlling deadline for completion of administrative action is, as
discussed above,251 twenty-four hours before the event. Then, more
than ever, the city's greater familiarity with the requisite procedures
makes it the proper party to initiate judicial activity.

4. The Deadline for Judicial Action
The conclusion that a permit scheme must set a deadline for
administrative action does not necessarily resolve the companion
problem of whether there must be a deadline for judicial action. It
is one thing to require the police chief or the park commissioner to
grant or deny a permit request within a week; it is quite another to
force a state court to schedule a hearing, postpone other pending
cases, hear hastily assembled evidence and hastily prepared argument,
deliberate, and render a principled decision, all against a rigid deadline.
Fortunately, the problem may not be so serious as would appear
at first. Preference statutes252 and court rules 253 in many states already
provide some protection against delay. Also, if the burden to seek
judicial validation of the permit denial is placed on the city, that
burden could be interpreted to mean that the city's failure to achieve
such validation by the time of the scheduled demonstration would
preclude a conviction for parading without a permit. Such a scheme,
which places the penalty for court delay on the city, would probably
lead to the innovative utilization by state judges of the docketpreference concept.
In Freedman, it will be remembered, the Court exhibited no such
faith in these alternative solutions to the problem of delay. It held
that a film censorship scheme must set out a fixed deadline for "final
judicial decision,"254 a requirement which it later interpreted to
apply only to the trial court stage,255 and to be satisfied by a nine-day
time lag between the administrative decision and the trial court
251. See text following note 247 supra.
252. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 527, 660, 1062a (West 1957). The state
statutes are collected in Note, Trial Calendar Advancement, 6 STAN. L. REv. 323, app.
II (1954).
253. See, e.g., N.Y.R. CIV. PRAc. 5521 (McKinney 1963), discussed in 7 J. WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN &: A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 5521.01-.02 (1964). See also
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Tex. 1965).
254. !l80 U.S. at 59.
255. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968). See
text accompanying note 220 supra.
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ruling. 256 One justification for the innovative Freedman holding may
be that the pressures for early determination that typically operate
in the demonstration context cannot be relied upon in film censorship cases. In film litigation, there is seldom a critical target date in
advance of which a judge will want to rule, whereas in demonstration
cases a judge will often set such a date either out of fairness or out
of fear that unreviewed administrative recalcitrance will breed defiance. There is less incentive for judicial efficiency in the film context also because defiance of film censorship board rulings is neither
so likely nor so disruptive as its counterpart in the demonstrations
context. The profit-maximizing exhibitor's willingness to tolerate
only so much delay before abandoning the interests of his viewing
public may further explain the Court's great attentiveness in Freedman to the problem of judicial delay, without compelling a similar
concern in demonstration cases. A final consideration may be the
relative potential for abuse of the procedural reform in the two
situations. Alienated demonstrators bent on "counter-harassment"
tactics could have a field day with the expedited procedures, since it
takes little effort to propose a demonstration and demand a permit;
the price of admission to the Freedman film censorship procedures is
a good deal higher: possession of a controversial film and a place to
show it.
Nevertheless, despite the distinctions and dangers outlined above,
the Freedman requirement of expedited judicial review should be
extended to disputes concerning demonstration permits. Although
there is some incentive, as detailed above,257 for a judge to decide a
case before a target date, a pass-the-buck mentality probably operates
on too many occasions, especially those involving docile demonstrators. Here again, there is little to be said for a policy that encourages
the cultivation of disruption potential. Furthermore, even if a judge is
pressured into ruling before a target date, a fixed deadline can, depending upon the degree of cooperation evinced by the demonstrators in submitting early applications, move up the date of decision
far enough to facilitate suitable planning by both the city and the
demonstrators. While the judge may also take this factor into consideration, he may not feel sufficient pressure to hasten his decision.
In any event, the demonstrators should know best how much advance
preparation is desirable and should, accordingly, have the option to
provide for that appropriate time increment after the final judicial
256. 390 U.S. at 690 n.22. See text accompanying note 223 supra.
257. See text accompanying notes 252-53 supra.
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decision by submitting their permit requests a calculable period of
time in advance.
Perhaps the best reason for a fixed deadline for trial court action
is that in a large number of cases it may be the only way to make
appellate review feasible. The local trial court judge is a member of
the community; often he is elected. A distant, multimember appellate panel will generally stand a much better chance of resisting the
local pressures that frequently accompany demonstration requests
made by unpopular groups. If there is no deadline for judicial action
and if the trial judge is hostile to the demonstrators' cause, he can
preclude the possibility of appellate review by delaying his decision
until the very eve of the scheduled event. While a deadline for judicial action would not totally solve this problem-in most instances
the appellate tribunal would still have to be willing to advance the
case on its own docket-at least it would prevent a hostile trial judge
from blocking the path to a more sympathetic tribunal.
Furthermore, if trial court hostility (or at least constitutional
myopia) is in fact a serious problem, perhaps there is a need to reexamine the Interstate Circuit dictum which states that Freedman's
"prompt final decision" refers only to the trial court ruling. 258 On
the other hand, expedited appellate review can mean burdensome
travel arrangements and the shuffling of precious docket resources.
It can also be argued that the process of expedition must end somewhere, and that one "day in court" would seem to be an adequate
allowance for those seeking preferred treatment. Moreover, the need
for unhurried deliberation, for "neutral principles," and for judicial
"craftsmanship," might be said to be stronger at the appellate level.
The spectre of a systematic harassment of the court system by wouldbe demonstrators might also be raised-this time with a more
compelling parade of horrors. Furthermore, a discretionary docketadvancement provision in the appellate court rules, such as existed
in Shuttlesworth,259 may be a sufficient vehicle for expedited appellate review: if the trial court denial is truly arbitrary and if the appellate court is truly sympathetic, the docket advancement can be
achieved without a deadline on appellate review; compulsory expedited review is likely to accomplish little more and is sure to breed
resentment among appellate judges. While the danger of trial court
inadequacy is not to be underestimated, these competing considerations should prevail: the statement in Interstate Circuit that the ex258. 390 U.S. at 690 n.22. See text accompanying note 220 supra.
259. Au. CODE, tit. 7 app., SOP. CT. R. 47 (1960), cited in Walker v. City of lfamingham, 388 U.S. 307, 319 (1967).
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peditious-review requirement applies only to the trial court ruling
should govern as well for the regulation of demonstrations, subject
to the caveat that the scheme must include a provision for discretionary docket advancement at the appellate court level.
On the question of the maximum permissible time lag between
the filing by the city of the suit for validation of a permit denial and
the trial court decision on that question, the nine days approved in
Interstate Circuit would seem to be too long. Since demonstrations
are so frequently keyed to a specific target date, and since the violence-potential element makes it imperative that the legal system be
promptly responsive to permit requests, the maximum permissible
time period for judicial action should be one week. When coupled
with the one-week time period for administrative action, that leaves
a time span of as much as two weeks between the filing of the permit
application and the trial court decision-a length of time already
bordering on the unrealistic for demonstrators operating in a turbulent political world.
Two other problems regarding the deadline for judicial action
are worthy of mention. First, what happens when the application is
filed so late as to make the one-week judicial deadline irrelevant?260
If, for example, an application is submitted three days before the
event and the city sues to validate a denial twenty-four hours before
the time scheduled for the demonstration, must the statutory scheme
require the trial court to reach a decision within the remaining
twenty-four hours? Or, if the application is filed thirteen days in
advance of the proposed event, and the city goes to court, as required, with six days remaining, can the trial judge simply let the
target date pass without doing anything? As was true for the administrative deadline, a refusal to provide special treatment in these
time-pressure cases can be defended as creating an incentive for early
planning and filing-assuming that the risk of judicial inaction is to
be borne by the demonstrators.261 That incentive, plus the interest
in a relatively orderly functioning of the courts, must be weighed
against the benefits that might accrue in having a special judicial
deadline for time-pressure cases. Those advantages, however, are
few: the likelihood is de minimis that an emergency trial court
deadline would make appellate review feasible; in any event there
would not be enough time after the final decision for careful, detailed planning; 262 and a trial judge who would use a "pocket veto"
260. See text accompanying note 251 supra.
261. See text accompanying note 257 supra.
262. The opportunity for such planning provided one rationale that supported
the standard judicial deadline.
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in the absence of a special deadline is unlikely to rule for the demonstrators, especially if the time pressure is such that he is not fearful
of appellate review. Accordingly, when time is so short that the oneweek judicial deadline would be inapplicable, there should be no
first amendment requirement that an emergency deadline for judicial review be instituted.
The remaining constitutional problem concerns a possible alternative system of administrative and judicial deadlines keyed not to the
number of days after filing, but rather to the number of days before
the scheduled event. Thus, a permit ordinance might provide that,
no matter how early the protesters apply, the final administrative
decision must come at least two weeks before the proposed date for the
demonstration, and the final trial court decision must come, for example, four days before that date. Such a scheme should not satisfy the
requirements of the first amendment. Some protest groups may feel
that it is very important to get a trial court decision on their application several weeks before the proposed event in order to make feasible elaborate planning or promotional activities, or to leave enough
time for unhurried appellate litigation. Courts should of course uphold reasonable advance-filing maximums in order to guard against
unseemly squatters' contests for scarce or distinctive sites and times;
but within the rather lengthy time periods remaining after that consideration is taken into account, applicants should be entitled to advance through the administrative and trial court stages in two weeks,
and to proceed with detailed planning or appellate litigation, as the
case maybe.
Thus, a thorough comparison of film censorship and demonstration regulation serves to substantiate the preliminary observations
made in Shuttlesworth that prior restraints on demonstrations should
be governed by the principles of Freedman v. Maryland. A final argument against the extension of Freedman might center on the Court's
failure in that case, and in Shuttlesworth. to consider the existing
alternative of injunctive relief in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.263 What justification, it may be asked, can there be for a
novel and intricate intrusion by the first amendment into the tranquil domain of state court procedures when the rights of assembly
are in no way dependent on those procedures? The justification
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
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might lie in the several potential obstacles to federal relief: the federal district judge may insist on an exhaustion of local administrative
remedies, even in the absence of an administrative deadline and in
the face of official delay; he may abstain; or he may sit hundreds of
miles away. In any event, the federal alternative places the burden of
initiating judicial proceedings on the demonstrators, and, as explained above,264 the shifting of that burden is probably the most
significant of the Freedman principles. Accordingly, the contention
should not be accepted that the Freedman reforms are unnecessary in
light of the existing federal remedies. The Supreme Court should
fulfill the promise of Shuttlesworth and insist that prior restraints
on demonstrations satisfy the procedural requirements outlined in
Freedman v. Maryland.

C. Appellate Review of Fact-Finding
The Court in Freedman did not presume to answer all procedural
questions which may arise in the prior-restraint context. One important procedural aspect with which Freedman did not deal is appellate
review of fact-finding.
It is a common practice in several kinds of first amendment cases
-libel,265 obscenity,266 contempt of court by publication,267 unlawful
advocacy268-for the Supreme Court to undertake an independent
examination of the record and to reach its mm factual conclusions.
Edwards v. South Carolina269 and Cox v. Louisiana270 established the
propriety of appellate fact-finding in mass assembly cases: "In the
area of First Amendment freedoms as well as areas involving other
constitutionally protected rights, 'we cannot avoid our responsibilities by permitting ourselves to be "completely bound by state court
determination of any issue essential to decision of a claim of federal
right ...."' " 271 The majority opinions in Edwards and Cox contain
generous excerpts from the trial transcripts, but in neither case did
the Court specifically overturn a formal lower court finding on an
264. See text accompanying notes 249-51 supra.
265. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964).
266. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964).
267. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946).
268. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927).
269. 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
270. 379 U.S. 536, 545 n.8 (1965). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
271. Haynes v, Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1963), quoted at 379 U.S. at
545 n.8.
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issue of primary fact. Furthermore, the Court's disclaimer related
only to being "completely bound."
In attempting to prevent extension of the practice of appellate
fact-finding to disputes concerning demonstration permit denials and
injunctions, it might be argued that since factual disputes are likely
to be complicated and time pressures are likely to be great, appellate
fact-finding is an empirical luxury that the judicial system simply
cannot afford. It might also be contended that Edwards and Cox
were wrongly decided on this point in the first place. Furthermore,
it might be argued that the analogy to other free speech cases is
faulty because trial court expertise can be important in resolving the
factual disputes which arise out of demonstrations, whereas an appellate court is likely to be just as good as a trial court at reading
incendiary pamphlets and scandal sheets and watching dirty movies.
A number of additional considerations suggest, however, that the
practice of appellate fact-finding in mass assembly cases is both desirable and applicable a fortiori in the prior-restraint context. The complexity of the factual determinations in mass-assembly cases makes
appellate review especially important, since the temptation must be
great for a trial judge-especially one working under enormous time
pressures-to defer excessively to the judgment of the city's "experts."272 The municipal judge may be under additional pressure
when those experts are likely to construe a rejection of their specialized judgment as an insult to their competence or integrity; municipal harmony may thus be a hidden issue. The complexity of the
competing-use determination and the impossibility of resolving it
by per se rules also make it desirable for the trial judge to be as
articulate and specific as possible in setting out his factual conclusions; nothing is likely to encourage this specificity as much as the
threat of appellate reversal.
Moreover, permit denials and injunctions are prior restraints and,
as such, the "facts" are not actual events, but merely estimates. The
danger that the subjective values of the decision-maker will color the
fact-finding process is especially great; thus, the need for an appellate
check is unusually strong. Also, because the crucial disputes will concern estimates by competing "experts," the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses will not be so important as their qualifications,
their logic, and their proof; thus, the "dry record" will be a more
adequate basis for appellate review than is usually the case. Finally,
and probably most important, fact-finding before the event places
272, See text following note 281 infra, and text accompanying notes 282-84 infra.
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enormous pressures on the decision-maker to err on the side of
regulation, since he is likely to be blamed if the demonstration is
approved and subsequently turns out to be more inconvenient or destructive than expected. Appellate fact-finding may suffer less from
this cautionary bias.
These pressures of complexity, subjectivity, and fear of blame
operate on appellate judges as well, but it is probably a fair generalization to say that their relative remoteness from local political pressures, their collective decision-making processes, and their somewhat
more detached perspectives are likely to produce better results in
enough cases to justify the added litigation costs of appellate fact:finding. Lest it be thought, however, that those same institutional
qualities may lead to unrealistic, "academic" judgments, it is also
safe to predict that appellate courts will still pay great deference to
lower court :findings and will exercise their fact-finding powers only
in extreme cases.
D. The Requirement of an Administrative Hearing
There is another important procedural question with which
Freedman did not deal. As mentioned previously,273 the prior-restraint scheme in Freedman provided for an administrative hearing,
so the Court was not forced in that case to decide whether such a
formal hearing is constitutionally required. The issue is important
because few demonstration permit systems provide for a formal administrative hearing.
In upholding the permit scheme in Cox v. New Hampshire,2 74.
the Supreme Court emphasized the procedural protections afforded
applicants at the administrative stage: "uniformity of method of
treatment upon the facts of each application"; 275 a "systematic, consistent and just order of treatment"; 276 and "a required investigation."277 The Court has held that the Constitution requires administrative hearings of some sort (not necessarily "trial-type") in bar
admission278 and welfare termination disputes; 279 lower courts have
273. See text following note 207 supra.
274. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
275. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 143, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at ~12 U.S. at
576.
276. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 143, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at 312 U.S. at 576.
277. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 146, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at 312
U.S. at 576.
278. Willner v. Committee on Character 8: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
279. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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applied the requirement to college disciplinary actions.280 While the
general principle is that de novo judicial review (as would exist for
demonstration permit disputes under the procedures advocated
above) precludes any due process objection to administrative proceedings,281 it can be argued that "first amendment due process" (the
"preferred procedural position") should not be so easily satisfiedthat permit applicants should be constitutionally entitled to a full
and fair hearing at each and every stage of the proceedings.
Several policy considerations might be marshalled in support of
such a contention. First, it can be argued that a hearing, because it
brings the factual issues more rapidly into focus, is likely to improve
the chances that the city will grant the permit without a court fight
-assuming, as seems plausible, that without a hearing the city will
generally resolve factual uncertainties in favor of rejecting the application. If a permit is to be issued eventually, it is preferable that
the granting of the permit be done voluntarily by city officials in the
first instance-not only because this saves time, judicial resources,
and litigation expenses, but also because such official cooperation is
likely to increase community tolerance, and to facilitate communication and planning between protestors and city officials. Moreover,
the time element is important to impartial decision-making is another respect: even though, as a rule, judges are more likely than
bureaucrats to recognize legitimate speech interests, this may not be
true when the bureaucrat has a week to explore the situation and the
judge has only twenty-four hours or less. Also, as Professor Davis has
argued, de novo judicial review may be a false muse "when the court
is strongly influenced by the agency's view, or when despite the theoretical scope of review the court limits its inquiry to reasonableness. "282 Furthermore, even if the administrative hearing does not
result in a permit being voluntarily granted, it may substantially
improve any subsequent judicial proceedings, especially if time pressure is great at the latter stage: the litigants will have already amassed
their evidence; they will be much better informed about each others'
contentions; and an administrative record, or at least administrative
findings, will be available to the judge so he can focus his inquiry on
the key points of dispute.
There are some respects, however, in which an administrative
280. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Soglin v.
Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), a/fd., 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
See generally Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L REY. 1027 (1969).
281. l K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.10 (1958).
282. Id. § 7,10, at 451.
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hearing may work to the detriment of the speech interest-a happenstance that does not necessarily cast aspersions on the desirability
of such a hearing, but which certainly undercuts the argument that
it is required as a matter of "first amendment due process." First,
there is reason to believe that city officials will be more accommodating to unpopular groups when the decisions of those officials are at
a level of "low visibility"-that is, when their affirmation of first
amendment rights need not be held up to the glaring light of voter
backlash, or when there is less opportunity for them to grandstand in
rejecting the filthy traitors. Second, even if the one-week administrative deadline would be feasible, a hearing requirement would cause
some needless delays within that period, particularly in those instances in which the city officials have firmly decided not to grant the
permit. There is nothing magic about a one-week time period; if a
hopelessly deadlocked dispute can be shifted to the courts in two days,
all the better. Third, the more the administrative determination resembles a court proceeding, the more judges may be tempted to defer
to the administrative judgment, albeit informally or subconsciously.
The above considerations serve only to devalue the pro-speech
side of the issue. On the pro-regulatory side must be included the
time drain on busy city officials, the scheduling and procedure-formulating headaches, and the potential for "counter-harassment." On
the whole, it would seem that the desirability of a hearing is a matter
of sufficient ambivalence that the first amendment, as procedurally
sensitized as it ought to be, should adopt a stance of benign neglect
toward the question.
If, however, a city should provide for a comprehensive administrative hearing, de novo judicial review of such a hearing should be
a constitutional requirement. Whether or not the ghost of Crowell v.
Benson283 still walks such that de novo review is necessary for all
"jurisdictional" and "constitutional" facts, 284 in the context of demonstration regulation there are special reasons for insisting on completely independent judicial fact-finding, including the making of a
fresh record. First, because of the time pressure, the administrative
record may be incomplete; new evidence and arguments based
thereon may come to light with each passing day. Also, disputes in
this area are frequently so controversial and so much in the public
eye that administrative bias is likely to be a serious problem no matter how nonpartisan the panel and how elaborate the procedural
283. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still
Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163 (1949). 284. 4 K. DAVIS, AnMINISrRATIVE LAW §§ 29.08-.09 (1958).

August 1970]

Prior Restraints on Demonstrations

1555

safeguards. Community pressure may result not only in a distorted
administrative record, but also in an excessive willingness by the reviewing judge to defer to that record, even when the formal standard
for review is "independent." Unwarranted judicial deference to administrative findings is to be feared also because of the time pressure.
A de novo standard cannot eliminate all of these temptations, but a
judge is less likely to fall prey to those temptations if he is forced
to listen to the evidence afresh.

E. Self-Help
The common law has long recognized that the most expeditious
"procedure" of all, self-help, may sometimes also be the most
efficacious. No matter how many deadlines are instituted and how
many burdens are shifted, permit applicants frequently will find
themselves empty-handed when the appointed hour for the demonstration arrives. What then? May they take to the streets and claim
their asserted constitutional rights, at the risk of criminal punishment
if their claim is ultimately rejected? Or can the legal system, having
made every effort to process their claims in advance, demand of the
demonstrators an abandonment or postponement of their constitutional entitlements? If self-help can somehow be made a workable
recourse in the explosive context of mass demonstrations, "judicialization" can be greatly enhanced: the substantive issues can be explored after the fact, under normal time pressures, and with more
carefully gathered evidence and the benefit of hindsight; the "highest
possible decision-maker" can become, in practice, the United States
Supreme Court.
Consider the following cases. A refuses to apply for a permit; he
undertakes a march that could have been prohibited in the first
place; he is prosecuted for parading without a permit under a statute
that is defective for overbreadth. B applies for a permit; he is rudely
rebuffed by a city official in clear violation of the state permit statute
(which is not invalid on its face); he marches anyway in a manner
that would be protected by the first amendment; he is prosecuted
for parading without a permit. C applies for a permit; he is rudely
rebuffed; he notifies city officials that he will march anyway; the
officials obtain an injunction against the march; the injunction is
overbroad and is also based on a state statute that is overbroad; C
marches in a manner ordinarily within his constitutional rights; he
is prosecuted for contempt. Under the law as it now stands, A wins,
but B and C lose!
It has always been true that regulations which are invalid on their
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face may be violated with impunity. Long before the civil liberties
revolution, that doctrine had been applied for the benefit of cigarette
vendors,285 contract carriers,286 and private detectives. 287 In Lovell v.
Griffin,228 a Jehovah's Witness convicted of distributing pamphlets
without a permit was allowed to challenge the constitutionality of
the ordinance under which she was prosecuted, even though she had
never applied for a permit. Since Lovell, defendants have successfully
raised the contention that a statute is invalid on its face after disobeying permit requirements dealing with handbills,289 labor union
solicitation,290 and film exhibition.291 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham292 recently applied the principle-rather mechanically and
over Justice Harlan's reservations 293-in the context of mass demonstrations. In attempting to justify the doctrine, the Supreme Court
has never gone beyond Blackstonian metaphysics: "[t]he statutes were
as though they did not exist."29 4
Quite a different principle governs when a regulatory scheme is
valid on its face but has been unconstitutionally applied to deny
a permit to a deserving applicant. The Supreme Court held in Poulos v. New Hampshire 295 that such a thwarted applicant must raise
his constitutional contention in a separate injunction or mandamus
proceeding, before he violates the statute. The case may very well
stand for the broad proposition that an unlawful permit refusal may
never be tested by demonstrating without the permit. A narrower
reading of Poulos is possible, however, because in that case there
was an unusually long lead time-six weeks-between the refusal of
the permit and the scheduled mass meeting-more than enough time
to bring a mandamus or injunction action and perhaps even one appeal therefrom. Thus, it is not clear whether the absolute duty to
obey the permit denial ends once the applicant has made every effort
to gain anticipatory relief, or whether, if he has not succeeded in
winning judicial relief by the time of the scheduled activity, he may
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900).
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53 (1916).
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Staub v. City of .Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
394 U.S. 147 (1969).
394 U.S. at 159-64 Gustice Harlan, concurring).
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 414 (1953).
345 U.S. 395 (1953).
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proceed without a permit and raise his contentions later in defense
to a criminal prosecution.
In Walker v. City of Birmingham296 the Supreme Court was
forced to decide whether an overly broad injunction based on an
overly broad statute297 was governed by Lovell or Poulos. The Poulos principle won out, even though the lead time between the issuance of the injunctions and the scheduled march in Walker was only
two days, and even though appellate review of the injunction could
be had within that time only in the discretion of the court. Relying on
labor cases that dealt with temporary restraining orders designed to
preserve the status quo pending litigation,298 the Court held that an
injunction-even an injunction changing the position of the parties
with no further litigation pending-must always be obeyed, with two
possible exceptions: if it is "transparently invalid,'' 299 or if "petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it in the
Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or frustration of their
constitutional claims."300 Poulos was cited with gusto; Lovell and
Blackstone (Does an invalid injunction "exist"? Even if it is based
on an invalid statute?) were ignored.
In defending the Court's present distinction between challenges
to permit statutes invalid on their face and challenges to permit refusals under concededly valid statutes, one might argue that statutes
invalid on their face are more harmful to speech in that they "chill"
everyone's right of expression, not just the right of a single rebuffed
applicant, and also that such statutes are more likely to be symptomatic of a discriminatory pattern of enforcement, whereas a single
improper-even discriminatory-refusal may be aberrational. On the
other hand, it is a daring behavioral assertion to claim that administrative action arguably within the confines of an overbroad statute
is likely to "chill" expression by laymen more than is similar action
seemingly in violation of a narrow statute; the latter conduct would
seem to indicate more official recalcitrance and hostility, and any
"chilling" is likely to come from word-of-mouth or newspaper knowledge that a given demonstration was rejected, rather than from an
abstract reading of the statutes.
If the two situations can be distinguished, the distinction should
296. 888 U.S. 307 (1967).
297. BIRMINGHAM, A.LA., CODE § 1159 (1944), the identical statute which was also
at issue in Shuttlesworth. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
298. E.g., Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922), discussed in Walker at 888 U.S.
at 813-14; In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962), discussed in Walker at 388 U.S. at 315 n.6.
299. 888 U.S. at 315.
800. 888 U.S. at 818.

1558

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:1481

cut the other way. When the constitutional challenge is to the statute
on its face, there is little to be gained by waiting to see the event
unfurl; when the issue is a particular permit refusal, on the other
hand, hindsight can be invaluable in judging the fairness of that refusal. Also, since any defendant can challenge a statute on its face, the
Lovell doctrine sometimes results in the acquittal of persons who
could have been denied a permit even under a narrowly drawn
statute; and these are precisely the demonstrators who are most likely
to cause serious public disorder, rather than those who win acquittal
only because they were by right entitled to a permit in the first place.
Actually, these inversions should serve only to illustrate the weakness
of the Court's present distinction. The best course would be to make
no distinction at all.
Injunctions are a different story. Near v. Minnesota301 to the contrary notwithstanding, injunctions do not have the same repressive
features exhibited by classic prior restraints such as licensing. When
speech is regulated by injunction, the burden of initiative is on the
censor (as it would be under the reformed procedures advocated
above); there is less ambiguity about who is covered; and the original decision is made by a judge after an adversary proceeding. Conceivably, too, there is less of a chilling effect, since laymen may well
consider injunctions to be sui generis. From the law-enforcement
side of the equation, there is something to be said for giving injunctions special status: a uniform absolute duty to obey-that is, to
abandon constitutional contentions when time does not permit final
judicial disposition in the form of Supreme Court review or certiorari denial-may be too rigid and may not command respect, but a
selective injunctive duty, if not squandered, may retain some moral
force.
Thus, Walker is not necessarily a bad decision: it may or may not
be, depending on whether the two exceptions-"transparently invalid" and "delay or frustration"-are interpreted broadly enough
to make the "duty to obey" a truly selective obligation, to be operative only when, on balance, the dangers of self-help exceed the
correlative "judicialization" advantages. 302 The balance will vary
somewhat in the two regulatory contexts-injunction and the streamlined permit process outlined above 303-and the self-help rules
should reflect that variance. As suggested above, however, no differ301. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
302. Such a determination need not be made, however, on an ad hoc basis but
can be formulated in per se rules.
303. See pts. m. B.-D. supra.
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entiation should be made on the basis of whether the constitutional
challenge is to the permit scheme on its face or to a specific permit
denial under a facially valid scheme.
First of all, there should be a general presumption, in both the
injunction and permit application contexts, against self-help. Even
when it is deemed to be a proper remedy-proper in the sense that
parties who ultimately prevail on the merits are not penalized for
having taken extra-legal action-self-help contains an element of defiance. While this defiance may be carefully calculated and tempered
in the minds of the group's leaders and lawyers, it is by no means
certain that the spirit of moderation will filter down to the masses,
or that police and bystanders will peaceably acknowledge the contextual propriety of the self-help remedy. Moreover, self-help may
take the city by surprise, causing a panicky response or extra inconvenience to other citizens because of inadequate policing of the event.
These reasons for the apprehension that self-help may have unfortunate consequences take on special significance when large numbers
of demonstrators are involved. Thus, as a general principle, cities
should be able to require that protesters challenge permit requirements and injunctions through the established anticipatory channels
-permit application, declaratory judgment, mandamus, motion to
vacate, and the like-and cities should be further allowed to treat
the failure to exhaust those anticipatory channels as a waiver of constitutional rights in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
There are at least four situations, however, for which anticipatory
litigation is not a satisfactory answer. First, the very right asserted
may be freedom from any prior restraint, as when a speaker contends not that he is entitled to a permit, but rather that he is entitled to speak without one. Second, the speaker may be unaware of
the permit requirement or unsure about whether it extends to the
particular activity he has planned. Third, the need for expression may
be so immediate that it allows no time to secure a permit, as was the
case for the truly spontaneous demonstrations following the assassination of Martin Luther King and the intervention in Cambodia.
Fourth, the demonstrators may diligently pursue all available advance remedies and still be left on the eve of the planned demonstration with neither vindication nor a final determination (Supreme
Court disposition) of their rights.
While it is true that the dangers associated with self-help are present in these situations as well, there are also strong countervailing
factors that must be considered. First, it would be unfair to derive
any support from the concept of waiver when the failure to achieve
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final adjudication in advance of the resort to self-help can in no way
be ascribed to any procedural culpability on the part of the protestors. Also, when the demonstrators' decision to engage in self-help
is made only out of necessity, there may be no defiance mentality at
work; the risk of violence may actually be greater should the city attempt to enforce the prohibition on self-help rather than allow the
demonstrators to proceed. Furthermore, a selective legitimation of
self-help in response to these considerations would not amount to an
abandonment of all checks on self-help, since normal criminal prohibitions would still be operative. The city would lose only two options: (I) to punish otherwise lawful behavior because it is done
without a permit, or in violation of the terms of an injunction; (2)
to engage in multiple charging-perhaps gaining plea-bargaining
leverage804-by adding a count of parading without a permit or contempt to other counts of disorderly conduct, obstructing public passageways, unlawful assembly, trespass, and the like. At the very least,
these additional factors suggest that the general rule against self-help
should not be mechanically applied in the four enumerated fact
situations. Rather, in those instances, the self-help issue must be resolved by a more detailed analysis.
I. Speech That Cannot Be Subjected to a Prior Restraint

The first situation is that of the speaker who claims that his activity cannot be subjected to any kind of prior restraint-perhaps a
nonamplified speech in a large park would fall into this category.305
In the context of a prosecution for speaking without a permit, this
constitutional contention should be heard even if the defendant
never bothered to apply for a permit or to challenge the permit requirement in advance, for if he is successful, the defendant will have
shown that he had a constitutional right to do exactly what he did:
speak without a permit. On the other hand, if the court concludes
that the particular activity may properly be subjected to a permit
requirement, but that in the immediate instance the speaker would
have been entitled to a permit had he applied, the speaker's failure
to utilize advance channels would be fatal to his defense.
The problem is more difficult in the injunction context. It is by
no means clear that there is any activity that can claim absolute
immunity from injunctive regulation-even the nonamplified
speech in the park might be constitutionally enjoined during an on304. See generally Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm.
L. REv. 50 (1968).
305. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 823 U.S. 516 (1945).
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going riot or upon proof that the speaker specifically intends to engage in violence. Most analogous to the situation in which a speaker
claims immunity from any prior restraint is when an injunction is
issued for obviously unconstitutional reasons306 and when an injunction is issued to enforce a permit requirement against an activity that
cannot constitutionally be subjected to such a requirement. For those
two kinds of injunctions, it may already be the law-in light of
Walker v. City of Birmingham301 and a 1945 case, Thomas v. Collins308-that a resort to self-help in the face of an injunction without
any attempt to seek advance relief does not preclude raising first
amendment contentions in subsequent contempt proceedings.
In Walker, it will be remembered, the Court qualified its proscription of self-help with the following observation: "Without question the state court that issued the injunction had, as a court of
equity, jurisdiction over the petitioners and over the subject matter
of the controversy. And this is not a case where the injunction was
transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity."309
It is still unclear whether this language represents merely a makeweight argument or a careful delineation of doctrine. In this regard,
it is perhaps noteworthy that subsequent cases have indicated that
the Walker injunction was in fact unconstitutional in at least two
respects-it was based on a statute invalid on its face 810 and it was
issued ex parte311-and yet those very cases have cited Walker without the slightest suggestion that it was decided wrongly on its facts.
In Thomas the defendant was served with a temporary restraining order just six hours before he was due to mount the hustings for
a scheduled speech. He flouted the order, was cited for contempt, and
won reversal from the Supreme Court upon successfully contending
that his speech could not, under the first amendment, be subjected
to the slightest prior restraint-not even a pro forma registration
requirement. The majority in Poulos distinguished Thomas by mistakenly claiming that the entire registration scheme had been declared unconstitutional on its face 312 but the Thomas court explicitly
806. Under the substantive standards advocated in this Article (see pts. II. B.-E.
supra), an obviously unconstitutional injunction would be based either on the content of the proposed speech, the fear of a hostile audience, or the past conduct of the
speaker.
307. 388 U.S. l!07 (1967).
308. l!2l! U.S. 516 (1945).
l!09. l!88 U.S. at l!I5.
l!IO. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150•51, 15l! (1969).
l!ll. Carroll v. President & Commrs., l!93 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
l!l2. l!45 U.S. at 413•14. It should be noted that this placed the case within the
confines of the Lovell doctrine.
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disavowed such a holding at two different places in the opinion.313
Thus, either Thomas has been obliquely overruled by Poulos, or
Thomas stands for one, or both, of two propositions: (1) injunctions
enforcing permit or registration requirements against activities that
are constitutionally immune from such prior restraints may be challenged by means of self-help without the necessity of resorting to any
available advance remedies; (2) whenever time does not allow for an
adequate advance remedy, self-help is a proper means of challenging
an injunction on first amendment grounds. This latter proposition is
relevant to the fourth enumerated fact situation (the failure to
achieve final disposition by the time set for the event) discussed
below314-but the former proposition, if it is in fact the correct reading of Thomas, would clearly make that case important authority
for the first fact situation, now under consideration.
Given, then, this unseemly tangle of cryptic precedents, what
should the law be? A number of arguments can be made for the contention that the duty to challenge an injunction in advance of the
planned event should be absolute-at least when time permits such
an advance challenge-and that any exceptions to this duty that
might be extrapolated from the Walker and Thomas opinions ought
to be nipped in the bud. It is always desirable that legal obligations
be unambiguous and unequivocal, but these features are especially
important when political passions run high, and when the legal obligation in question lacks such other legitimating supports as conception in the abstract, legislative approval, and general applicability.
Once more, self-help raises the risk of violence--city officials are
likely to be blind to the transparent invalidity of the injunction and
can be expected to enforce it; an appellate court in vacating the injunction can avert the risk of violence and can sometimes achieve
last-minute cooperation between demonstrators and city officials. It
might also be hypothesized that the quantitative advantages of any exceptions for "transparency," "frivolity," or whatever, are likely to be
too insignificant to justify sacrificing the clarity and moral force of an
absolute duty: no doubt many judges issue unconstitutional injunctions, but how often are transparently invalid injunctions granted?
Moreover, from the standpoint of judicial economy, there is much to
be said for avoiding the necessity for two-dimensional constitutional
line-drawing: What is invalid? What is transparently invalid? Finally,
in situations like that presented in Thomas, it makes sense to give
the city an incentive to enforce its permit system by obtaining an in313. 323 U.S. at 532-33, 541-42.
314. See text accompanying notes 331-49 infra.
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junction in advance rather than by simply lying in wait for the demonstrators and arresting them for speaking or marching without a
permit. In this regard, an anticipatory injunction puts the demonstrators on notice that their proposed event is, at least in the minds of
the city and the issuing judge, subject to the permit requirement.
Also, the city's injunction request may be denied on the ground that
the event cannot be subjected to the permit requirement, and it is
better for all concerned that such a judicial determination come before the event, rather than after the demonstration has been aborted,
the demonstrators arrested, and the community subjected to whatever
violence and disruption may ensue in the process.
Against these several considerations, it is difficult to imagine any
countervailing arguments that would justify an exception to the absolute duty to make an advance challenge to all injunctions, no matter how obviously invalid, so long as time permits. Perhaps the ghost
of Blackstone, however, would explain that a transparently invalid
injunction does not exist, whereas a merely invalid injunction, being
nontransparent, must be real.

2. Ignorance of the Prior Restraint
The second situation-in which the protestors are unaware of the
prior restraint or unsure of its scope-arises primarily in the context
of prosecutions for speaking without a permit, since most jurisdictions make actual notice of an injunction a prerequisite to a conviction for contempt. While no court appears to have addressed itself
directly to the question whether the first amendment requires a
general alteration in the normal criminal or equitable rules regarding notice, the Supreme Court has grappled with a number of related
problems.
In Lambert v. California,315 a Los Angeles ordinance making it
unlawful for a convicted felon to remain in the city for more than
five days without registering was held to be violative of due process
"where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his
duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of
such knowledge."316 The Court was careful, however, to stress the
unique features of the ordinance in question and thus squelched any
implication that ignorance of the law will always be a constitutional
defense in prosecution for failure to comply with a registration or
permit statute: "Violation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any
315. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
316. 355 U.S. at 227.

Michigan Law Review

1564

[Vol. 68:1481

activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the test. Moreover,
circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity
of registration are completely lacking."317 While Lambert thus cannot be read as an across-the-board limitation on strict liability and
constructive notice, it can be argued that the rather demanding standard of notice applied in the case may also be a proper one when
first amendment interests are at stake. Such a contention would find
support in Smith v. California,318 in which the Court held that some
element of scienter is constitutionally required to convict booksellers
for possession of obscene literature. Although Smith dealt with ignorance of facts rather than of law,319 and although the holding was
based on the phenomenon of self-censorship320-a phenomenon
which may function differently when the strict liability relates to
ignorance of the law-the case is nonetheless important for the general proposition that a more demanding mens rea requirement may
be one element of the burgeoning concept of "first amendment due
process."
While Lambert and Smith can only be regarded as faint probes,
at least on the notice issue with respect to prior restraints on demontrations, one of the Court's holdings in Cox v. Louisiana321 has a
more definite thrust. The defendant in Cox was convicted under a
statute that prohibited picketing "near" a courthouse.322 It was uncontested that he had picketed approximately 125 feet from the courthouse, but the Court held that the defendant's "mistake of law" was
exculpatory as a matter of due process (with no special reliance on the
first amendment) because he had been misled by city officials on the
scene who had, at least in the Court's reading of the record,323 given
him permission to picket where he did. Thus, a violation committed
on the basis of a mistake of law induced by city officials was held to
amount to no violation at all.
This background of case precedent offers a good starting point
for a more comprehensive approach to the problem of mistake of law
as it relates to self-help. First, on the special problem of a mistake of
law induced by city officials, the Cox holding is clearly correct, at
least if one accepts the Court's reading of the record. There are a
317.
818.
819.
820.
821.
322.
328.

855
861
861
361
379
LA.
379

U.S. at 229.
U.S. 147 (1959).
U.S. at 149.
U.S. at 154.
U.S. 559 (1965).
REv. STAT. § 14:401 (Supp. 1962), quoted at 879 U.S. at 560.
U.S. at 569.
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number of general reasons for a separate rule when government officials have induced the mistake on the part of the demonstrators: the
absence of blameworthiness on the part of the demonstrators; the
desirability of giving city officials an incentive to know what they
are talking about; the de minimis danger-serious in other mistakeof-law cases-that demonstrators may intentionally preserve their
ignorance of the law if it works to their legal advantage. Moreover, a
separate approach to these cases is particularly essential in the context
of prior restraints on demonstrations for two reasons: (1) in an atmosphere of charged emotions, a broken promise or change of position by the city is likely to be especially dangerous and should,
accordingly, be discouraged by a strong "estoppel" doctrine; and
(2) protestors should be given every incentive to consult city hall in
advance-including the hope of winning binding concessions-and
should be freed from every disincentive-including the possibility
of being "entrapped" by a mistaken interpretation of the law. Indeed,
the best course of action for the Court to take would be to enshrine
in due process, or at least in "first amendment due process," the
following provision from the Model Penal Code, which was cited
with approval in the Cox opinion:
(3) A reasonable belief that conduct does not legally constitute an
offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon
such conduct, when:

(b) [the defendant] acts in reasonable reliance upon an official
statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or
erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a
judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative
order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation
of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of
the law defining the offense.a24
With regard to mistakes of law that cannot be blamed on government officials, three basic approaches to the problem can be imagined:
(1) a requirement that actual knowledge of the law should be a prerequisite to conviction; (2) a negligence standard whereby failure to
apply for a permit, or violation of the terms of an injunction, would
be punishable only upon proof of either actual knowledge of the
law or a negligent failure to be aware of or inquire about the law;
(3) a firm application of the principle that ignorance of the law should
be no defense.
ll24. MODEL
at569 n.l!.

PENAL CODE §

2.04(ll)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), cited at ll79 U.S.
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With respect to direct criminal prosecutions for activities without
the required permit, an application of the negligence standard would
appear to be the best approach; indeed, it should be constitutionally
required in such situations. A requirement of actual knowledge
would be undesirable in that it would reward ignorance in an area
in which familiarity with the law and advance efforts to communicate
with city officials ought to be strongly encouraged. Also, an actualknowledge standard would tend to complicate litigation-always a
factor to be considered, although admittedly the consideration is not
so crucial here as in the context of expedited litigation.325
On the other hand, prosecution of demonstrators whose ignorance
of the law cannot be deemed at least negligent would seem to be
unnecessarily harsh in light of the other adequate regulatory safeguards available to the city-particularly the standard criminal prohibitions.326 Furthermore, there is a great potential for disruption and
radicalization when the police attempt on-the-spot enforcement of a
regulation against demonstrators who reasonably believe that they
have not been given a fair opportunity to comply with the regulation.
Thus, the first amendment should be read to require that at least
reasonable-that is, nonnegligent-ignorance of the permit requirement be exculpatory.
The same constitutional principle should also apply to injunctions. The first amendment should not independently shield a
demonstrator who negligently remains unaware of an injunction that
binds him,321 although most jurisdictions insist on actual notice as
a matter of the law of equity.328 A constitutional standard of negli325. See text accompanying notes 252-64 supra.
326. The self-help privilege, as developed herein, would shield demonstrators only
from convictions for violating prior restraints. A comprehensive analysis of subsequent
punishments for demonstrations might conclude that offenses such as breach of the
peace, unlawful assembly, or obstructing public passageways, should be subjected to
special constitutional limitations when demonstrators have sought to cooperate in
advance with city officials or when spontaneity is justified. That, however, is a question
of some magnitude and beyond the scope of this discussion. It is sufficient, for present
purposes, to note that most self-help protest activities are not, apart from the priorrestraint aspect, unlawful. The one important exception to this generalization is when
demonstrators cordon off a street, an action which would no doubt support a
conviction for obstructing public passageways. That particular form of self-help,
however, is so likely to cause serious disruption, and to lead to retaliatory "self-help"
by drivers and pedestrians, that it ought to be absolutely prohibited.
327. Typically, this situation would arise only in the case of injunctions of the
broad, class-action variety, although it is not an absolute requirement that a person
have been a party to an injunction proceeding in order to be bound by the decree.
See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 994, 1028-31 (1965).
328. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 33 F.2d 489, 490-91 (8th Cir. 1929); Garrigan
v. United States, 163 F. 16 (7th Cir 1908); The Cape May &: Schellinger's Landing R.R.
Co. v. Johnson, 35 N.J. Eq. 422 (Ch. 1882). See generally Note, Contempt Proceedings
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gence would probably have more impact when the mistake of law
goes not to the existence of the injunction but to its interpretation.
In that situation, there is a need to protect demonstrators against
ambiguously or broadly phrased injunctions, especially in view of
the temptations to employ such injunctions: drafting a narrow injunction can be a time-consuming process; when particularly notorious groups are the subject of the injunction, the city may understandably attempt to secure an open-ended regulatory weapon.
Thus, in both the injunction and direct-prosecution situations,
"first amendment due process" should require that nonnegligent
mistakes of law not induced by government officials be exculpatory,
but apart from that states and municipalities should remain free to
shape their mm notice doctrines.
3. The Spontaneous Demonstration

The third situation in which an insistence on the use of advance
channels rather than self-help may be unfair is that of the spontaneous demonstration. Earlier it was suggested that any exception to
the demonstrators' obligation to give city officials the required advance
notice-up to forty-eight hours-ought to be confined to exceptional
cases in which unforeseen events of obvious importance make immediate protest efficacious. 329 Thus, by hypothesis, if the day after the
intervention in Cambodia a student group wished to march in protest,
a city should not be able to reject a permit request simply because
there would not be forty-eight hours lead time. But should the
students be permitted to march the day after the announcement of
the invasion without attempting in the interim to secure a permit?
Moreover, should the group be permitted to commandeer the streets
immediately after the President's patriotic peroration?
As to the former question, the rule ought to be one that requires
strict exhaustion of all available advance channels of relief-formal
and informal. Even if the time factor would not allow for adequate
deliberation on the permit request in terms of the substantive
standards discussed above,330 the bare notification that a demonstration is planned can be of great assistance to a city in formulating an
orderly response to the event. Municipalities should thus be able to
prosecute "spontaneous" demonstrators for failure to possess a permit
Against Persons Not Named in an Injunction, 46 HARv. L. REv. !!HI (1933); Note,
Criminal Contempt: Violations of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 32 IND. L.J. 514,
524-28 (1957).
329. See text following note 175 supra.
!130. See pt. II. supra.
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if there was any meaningful time period-two hours or moreduring which the group could have attempted to get official permission to demonstrate, but failed to do so.
The literally spontaneous outpouring presents a far more difficult
dilemma than the semi-spontaneous phenomenon just discussed.
Emotions are likely to be at a summit of intensity such that any
interference with the demonstrators by the police will ordinarily
create an enormous risk of violence, yet, at the same time, the disruption potential in terms of competing public uses, uncontrollable
lawlessness, and hostile backlash will usually also be at a ma.ximum
because of the element of surprise. Furthermore, it is probable that
the choice of a legal doctrine is unlikely to influence behavior in
these circumstances: no matter what first amendment principle is
deemed controlling, the protestors will still take to the streets in these
moments of passion, and the police will still make arrests when they
believe that the demonstration is getting out of hand. If this perception is correct, the spontaneity issue-unlike almost all the other
issues growing out of prior restraints on demonstrations-should be
decided on the basis of fairness alone, with no attempt to erect deterrents and incentives. Surely there is little to be said for punishing
the demonstrators for their failure to secure a permit, for if their behavior is truly spontaneous, such a failure certainly cannot be characterized as blameworthy. Admittedly, however, spontaneity is extremely difficult to establish or refute by way of convincing proof.
This difficulty of proof could lead to the abuse of any self-help
privilege for spontaneity; that is why the objective standard for
spontaneity-"in response to unforeseen events of obvious importance"-is preferable to any subjective test.

4. Inability on the Part of the Demonstrators To
Secure Relief Through Advance Channels
The fourth, and probably most important, situation in which
self-help may be the only efficacious procedure for would-be demonstrators is that in which the protestors have made every reasonable
effort to seek relief through advance channels and have not received
by the time scheduled for the demonstration either the relief sought
or a final determination-in the form of a Supreme Court ruling or
denial of certiorari-of their legal claims. Since few, if any, demonstrations are planned far enough in advance to allow the case to wend
its way up to the Supreme Court, the real issue here is whether the
general disapproval of self-help is to be embodied as an unqualified
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duty of obedience, subject to the few exceptions discussed above,331
or merely as a requirement that the preferable advance remedies be
exhausted before resorting to self-help. If one accepts the argument
that the identity of the ultimate decision-maker is every bit as important as the applicable substantive doctrine,332 it is apparent that this
particular issue is of crucial significance.
A strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court has already opted for a rule of exhaustion rather than one of absolute
obedience. As previously discussed,333 this may be the explanation
for the result in Thomas v. Collins.334 Also, the Walker holding was
sharply qualified:
This case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture
if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged

it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or frustration
of their constitutional claims. But there is no showing that such
would have been the fate of a timely motion to modify or dissolve
the injunction. There was an interim of two days between the issuance of the injunction and the Good Friday march. The petitioners
give absolutely no explanation of why they did not make some application to the state court during that period.335
Moreover, the Walker majority distinguished an earlier case, In re
Green,336 on the ground that "[t]he petitioner in Green, unlike the
petitioners here, had attempted to challenge the validity of the injunction before violating it by promptly applying to the issuing court
for an order vacating the injunction."337 It may also be significant
that in neither Howat v. Kansas 338 nor United States v. United Mine
Workers of America,339 the primary doctrinal precedents for the
Walker holding, had the contempt defendants exhausted their advance channels of relief. Finally, toward the end of the Walker
opinion, the Court stated that "[the defendants] could not bypass
orderly judicial review of the injunction before disobeying it,"340
331. See text accompanying notes 305-30 supra.
332. See pts. III. C.-D. supra.
333. See text accompanying note 314 supra.
334. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). Thomas made no attempt to vacate the injunction which
was served on him in Houston six hours before his scheduled speech, but that could
only have been done in Austin, 170 miles away-a round-trip of more than six hours
in 1945.
335. 388 U.S. at 318-19.
336. 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
337. 388 U.S. at 315 n.6.
!!38. 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
339. 330 U.S. 258 {1947).
340. 388 U.S. at 320.
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thus implying that an exhaustion of advance channels might justify
disobedience. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Court's
use in Walker of the phrase "delay or frustration of their constitutional claims"341 could be interpreted as a studied omission of the
word "rejection," and also that the Howat statement of the doctrine,
cited with approval in Walker, tends to support an absolute-obedience interpretation: "until the decision of the [issuing court] is
reversed for error by orderly review, either by the [issuing court]
or a higher court, [its orders] based on its decision are to be respected
and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be
punished. " 342
This ambiguity concerning the true meaning of Walker ought to
be resolved in favor of the exhaustion interpretation. As always, an
overriding goal should be to encourage demonstrators to establish
lines of communication with city officials. 343 A legitimation of selfhel p, holding out the promise of eventual acquittal on contempt or
criminal charges, but conditioned on an exhaustion of advance
channels, would seem to provide demonstrators with a powerful
incentive to use those channels, even when they are skeptical about
the possibility of obtaining direct relief. Any uneasiness about
legitimating defiant behavior should be partially allayed by the fact
that the normal criminal prohibitions would still be operative.344
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the employment of
self-help by demonstrators cannot be undertaken with reckless abandon; the tactic must remain a calculated gamble since the demonstrators will be acquitted of contempt or other criminal charges only if
they prevail on the merits. It might even be suggested that the above
factors, when added to the requirement of strict exhaustion, will
result in a filtering process that will make virtually irrelevant the
broad fears about a defiance mentality that underlie much of the
general disdain for self-help.
In support of the absolute-obedience interpretation, on the other
hand, one might point to the virtues of a clear, unequivocal legal
duty. Such an argument is seriously undercut, however, by the prevailing doctrines which provide that an injunction may be defied
when it has been issued by a court without jurisdiction,345 and that
a statute may be flouted when it is unconstitutional on its face. 346
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

388 U.S. at 318.
258 U.S. at 189-90, cited at 388 U.S. at 314.
See text following note 281 supra.
See note 326 supra and accompanying text.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 285-94 supra.
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Furthermore, it is not even clear that one who attaches virtually exclusive significance to avoiding street confrontations should favor the
absolute-obedience interpretation: "hard-core" dissenters will take to
the streets no matter what the self-help doctrines are, but they may
be more interested in keeping their demonstration orderly if they
have hopes of prevailing on the merits. Moreover, if self-help is
absolutely taboo, respectable dissenters are likely to stay away, leaving
the battleground entirely to the more defiant demonstrators, whereas
a conditional legitimation of the tactic may encourage those protestors
capable of exercising a moderating influence to be present.
It might be suggested that the exhaustion interpretation ought to
prevail only in those situations in which the exact proposed date of
the demonstration has some special significance for reasons of symbolism, nationwide coordination, or whatever. The two best law
review commentaries on the general problem of the duty to obey
allegedly unlawful injunctions347 both favor the exhaustion approach
but would limit it to those instances in which "obedience would have
subjected [the protestors] to significant and irreparable harm." 348 As
with the consideration of reasonable alternatives in deciding the
merits of a permit application,349 however, it would be anomalous
to allow judges to second-guess the protestors' own judgment concerning timing strategy, especially since it would seem that in cases
in which demonstrators do not feel strongly about the target date,
they would prefer to accept a delay in order to pursue further advance remedies, rather than to employ self-help at the risk of a contempt conviction if they were unsuccessful on the merits. Furthermore, attorneys charged with advising groups about their self-help
rights might justifiably chafe at the prospect of having to calculate
not only the odds of success on the merits, but also the odds of persuading the court of the special significance of the particular date.
Thus, the simpler rule of a universal self-help privilege conditioned
on a thorough exhaustion of all advance channels is much to be preferred.
·. ,

!f~!J

To recapitulate, protestors faced with prior restraints should be
required to exhaust all advance channels of relief before taking to
the streets. This strict exhaustion requirement should govern regardless of whether the prior restraint is an injunction or a permit
347. Cox, The Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 86 (1948);
Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REv. 626 (1970).
348. Note, supra note 347, at 642.
349. See text accompanying notes 61-69 supra.
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requirement, regardless -of whether the protestors' constitutional
challenge is to the regulatory scheme "on its face" or "as applied,"
and regardless of how "transparently" unconstitutional the prior
restraint may be. Self-help should be permissible only in a few specialized instances: (I) when the particular protest activity cannot constitutionally be subjected to any kind of a permit requirement and
the government has not obtained an injunction either to restrain
the activity directly or to enforce the permit requirement; (2) when
the demonstrators are nonnegligently unaware of the existence or
scope of the prior restraint, or act in reasonable reliance on an interpretation of the law given by a local official; (3) when unforeseen
events of obvious importance make immediate protest efficacious;
(4) when demonstrators have exhausted all available advance channels in the state court system and have not received by the scheduled
date of the event either vindication or final determination of their
constitutional claims.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Prior restraints on demonstrations should be subjected to more
vigorous constitutional scrutiny, both with regard to substantive
standards and procedures. In the substantive realm, competing public
uses should not be measured, as at present, by such open-ended terms
as "reasonable," "undue," and "convenience," but rather should be
quantified, albeit somewhat arbitrarily: it should be unconstitutional
to prohibit a proposed demonstration unless the number of persons
seriously inconvenienced (in terms of driving and pedestrian delays,
and losses of access, parking, and quietude) exceeds the number of
persons who would participate in the event, or unless the number of
those inconvenienced in a minor way is grossly disproportionate to
the number of participants. So long as this numerical balancing
formula is enforced, municipalities should not be required to give
different groups equal treatment with respect to the use of public
'iand for mass demonstrations; it ought to be permissible to favor
popular groups with a "speech surplus." On the other hand, a
demonstration should never be prohibited because there are "reasonable alternatives" in terms of time and site available to the protestors.
Per se prohibitions relating to time, place, size, and duration should
be upheld only if, for the overwhelming majority of cases that fall
within their ken, the municipal balancing formula would likewise
justify prohibition.
Never should a demonstration be prohibited on the basis of the
content of proposed speeches and placards, the fear of a hostile
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audience, or the past conduct of the demonstrators. If it can be
proved, however, that the demonstrators have a specific intent to
engage in or provoke violence, that should be a sufficient ground for
denying a permit or issuing an injunction. Also, injunctions against
specific speeches and placards should be permissible if the content
would be punishable, consistent with the first amendment, in subsequent criminal and civil proceedings, but such an injunction should
never be a basis for prohibiting the entire gathering.
Municipalities should be able to prohibit gatherings on the
ground that the demonstrators did not give notice or apply for a
permit far enough in advance, but no advance-filing requirement of
longer than forty-eight hours ought to be upheld, and cities should
be required to allow spontaneous demonstrations when they are in
response to unforeseen events of obvious importance. All advancepayment requirements (insurance, peace bonds, payment for police
services) should be held to be violative of the first amendment, but
a city should be able to require that the protest organizers make a
good faith effort to raise funds at the event in order to defray the
policing and clean-up costs.
In addition to these constitutional restrictions on the reasons that
may justify prior restraints, the Supreme Court should subject
demonstration regulation to the same procedural requirements now
in force in the film censorship area. The city should always bear the
burden of proof, except on the issue of how many participants are
expected to take part in the demonstration. Permit schemes should
be required to include a deadline for administrative action-such a
deadline should be no longer than one week after the filing of the
permit application, with a special provision that applications filed
within a week of the proposed demonstrations be ruled upon by city
officials at least nventy-four hours before the scheduled time for the
event. The burden of initiating judicial proceedings should be on
the city government, and local trial courts should be required to
render a final decision within one week after the city's decision to go
to court rather than grant the permit.
There should be no constitutional requirement of an administrative hearing; and when formal hearings are initiated at the administrative stage, judicial review should be of the de novo variety. Furthermore, appellate courts should make independent determinations
of fact on the basis of the trial court record.
Demonstrators should be held to a strict duty to exhaust all
advance remedies, subject to exceptions for activities that are totally
immune by virtue of the first amendment from any sort of permit
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requirement, for reasonable mistakes of law, and for spontaneous
demonstrations. Once protestors have exhausted all advance channels,
however, they should be allowed to claim their asserted rights by
self-help.
These conclusions depend, to an inordinate extent, on predictions
of behavior-predictions unsubstantiated by survey data or "interdisciplinary" documentation. As is true in almost every modern problem area, the issues that arise out of mass demonstrations must, of
necessity, be resolved without the benefit of empirical knowledge.
Until that situation is corrected, the choice is between careful guesswork and analytic paralysis. Readers who object-on general principle or on the basis of a particular philosophy of judicial review-to
departure from the status quo in the absence of "hard" data may
wish to treat this entire discussion as presenting an agenda for
quantitative research rather than, as is intended, a program for immediate doctrinal reform. It may be, however, that today the process
of constitutional innovation is itself working against a deadline.

